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Abstract
In the field of privacy-preserving data mining the common practice has been to gather
data from the users, centralize it in a single database, and employ various anonymization
techniques to protect the personally identifiable information contained within the data.
Both theoretical analyses and real-world examples of data breaches have proven that these
methods have severe shortcomings in protecting an individual’s privacy. A breakthrough
may have been achieved in 2006 when a method called differential privacy was proposed
as a mathematical guarantee for the privacy of each record in a data set. Since then, an
avenue of research has been to make this concept work in a distributed setting.
In this thesis we propose a decentralized framework that allows users to perform clas-
sification after aggregating their locally trained models in a privacy-preserving manner.
We describe a series of experiments on the tuning of each major parameter involved, and
show the effects of these on the privacy-utility trade-off. We also compare our classifi-
cation performance to other cases in the literature and show how we achieve competitive
performance.
Based on our results, we have produced a set of criteria for applying differential privacy
to a machine learning application, as well as two business sectors where we see potential
for a successful system. We hope that our research will pave the way for distributed ap-
plications where users maintain control of their own data, and use it for learning without
giving up their privacy.
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Sammendrag
Innenfor forskningsfeltet kalt privacy-preserving data mining har det lenge vært vanlig
praksis a˚ samle data fra en mengde brukere, sentralisere den i en stor database, og sa˚
anvende ulike anonymiseringsteknikker for a˚ beskytte de sensitive personopplysningene
iboende i dataen. Ba˚de teoretiske analyser og virkelige hendelser med datainnbrudd har
bevist at disse metodene har alvorlige svakheter i hvordan de beskytter individers person-
opplysninger. Et mulig gjennombrudd ble oppna˚dd i 2006 da en metode kalt differential
privacy ble framlagt med en matematisk garanti for a˚ beskytte hver rad i et datasett. Siden
da har det vært et av fokusene i forskning a˚ fa˚ dette konseptet til a˚ virke i en distribuert
omgivelse.
I denne masteroppgaven har vi foresla˚tt et desentralisert rammeverk som lar brukerne
gjennomføre klassifisering etter a˚ ha aggregert sine lokalt trente modeller, pa˚ en ma˚te som
beskytter deres personopplysninger. Vi beskriver en rekke eksperimenter hvor vi justerte
hvert enkelt parameter, og viser hvilken innvirkning dette har pa˚ avveiningen mellom nyt-
ten av resultatet og personvernsniva˚et. Vi har ogsa˚ sammenlignet va˚r klassifiseringsytelse
med andre resultater presentert i forskningslitteraturen og viser at vi har oppna˚dd konkur-
ransedyktige resultater.
Basert pa˚ va˚re resultater, har vi produsert et sett med kriterier for hvordan man skal
anvende differential privacy i en maskinlæringsapplikasjon. I tillegg har vi vist til to sek-
torer i forretningslivet hvor vi ser potensiale for a˚ skape et vellykket system. Vi ha˚per
at va˚r forskning vil virke hjelpe muliggjøre distribuerte applikasjoner hvor brukerne be-
holder kontroll over sine data, og kan bruke den for læring uten a˚ gi fra seg sine personop-
plysninger.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
All over the world people are interacting with technology more than ever; when using their
cell phone, shopping online, visiting a doctor who uses electronic records, and in countless
other acts. This usage generates a massive amount of information, leading to data being
more deeply integrated into our daily lives than ever before. Sintef published a report in
2013 which stated that: ”A full 90% of all the data in the world has been generated over
the last two years [Dragland, 2013].” With this massive influx of information, new fields
of both academic study and commercial interest have appeared to find out how to best
analyze this data.
The terms ”big data” and ”analytics” have been widely used as common designations
for this emerging field of technology. The communal definition for describing big data
stems from a 2001 research report[Laney, 2001], in which analyst Doug Laney defined the
problem as a three-dimensional challenge: ”Big data is high-volume, -velocity and -variety
information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing
for enhanced insight and decision making.” The first part of his challenge, commonly
known as the 3 Vs of big data, deals with the necessary qualifications for data to be called
”big data”, while part two and three is the how and why.
The wide variety of the potential applications of big data analytics have also raised
essential questions about whether our social and ethical norms are sufficient to protect
privacy in a world which has entered ”the era of big data”. Both in the European Union
and in the United States there have been efforts made to create new laws for handling data
privacy. The Council to the President, an advisory group to the US President, concluded
in their 2014 report [U.S Government, 2014] that preserving privacy values would be their
number one recommendation when designing a new policy framework for big data. Fur-
thermore, they advised that more than 70 million USD should be made available to federal
research in privacy-enhancing technologies.
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1.1 Problem Statement
The objective of this study is to contribute to the aforementioned field of study, more
specifically in the area of Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM). In our work we ex-
plore the utility of employing a privacy-preserving technique called differential privacy.
Relying on previous research on differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, and peer
to peer communication, we would like to create an framework that allows for distributed,
scalable machine learning while preserving the privacy of the participants.
RQ1: How big is the loss of accuracy in a distributed, differentially private system,
compared to a centrally trained model?
While there have been research on both distributed and differentially private machine
learning systems, there have been very little research done on a combination of both. Re-
sults from research on differential privacy indicate that there often is a trade-off between
privacy and a loss of accuracy. We want to study this trade-off in our distributed approach
and analyze which factors comes into play and how they can be handled in a way that leads
to an optimal result.
RQ2: How can the variance in accuracy between participants be minimized?
Our system architecture is based on a notion of independent peers which collaborate to
create aggregated logistic regression models which is used for classification. Due to there
not being one single centralized classifier, there will most likely be a variance in the ac-
curacy of the classifiers each peer hold. We want to explore options on how to reduce
this variance, so that we can reduce the likelihood of one peer having a well-performing
classifier while another produces poor classification results.
RQ3: Can we validate and enhance earlier research in distributed differentially pri-
vate machine learning?
Our own research does not exist in a vacuum, so we intend to study and employ techniques
reported in the literature, and try to validate and enhance their results.
1.2 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2: Background and Motivation
This chapter introduces some concepts in privacy-preserving data publishing, and provides
a thorough background on our motivation for doing this project.
Chapter 4: Basic Theory
This chapter presents the basic theory necessary to gain an understanding of our project.
Important concepts such as differential privacy and multi-party logistic regression is pre-
sented in an condensed and straightforward manner.
2
1.2 Thesis Structure
Chapter 4: Related Work
As our work is but a part of a bigger research effort, we use this chapter to give an overview
of works similar to our own. Most of these papers we are presenting have helped shape
our own project in some way, either through theory or as inspiration.
Chapter 5: Design of Experiments
Here we present the architecture and execution of our experimental procedure. We detail
the usage of data sets and how they were preprocessed, as well as how we tuned the
parameters involved. Toward the end of the chapter, we explain the algorithms we employ.
Chapter 6: Experiment Planning and Results
This chapter list the set of experiments we have performed in a clear and concise manner.
The first part of the chapter explain each experiment in detail, and provides the parameter
setup we used for each run. The last part lists the results we achieved.
Chapter 7: Analysis
All of the scientific results we have gained through our experimentation are analyzed in this
chapter. The main part of the analysis will be used to explain the impact each parameter
can have on the final results of our classifier.
Chapter 8: Toward a Real-World Application
This chapter is intended to be discussion on the real-world utility of our distributed privacy
framework. We start by proposing a set of suitability criteria for such an application, and
then explore two potential business cases where we consider our framework to be suitable
for future implementation.
Chapter 9: Reflections and Conclusion
This final chapter provides a reflection on the research we have explored, as well as the
some of the challenges we have encountered. We then suggest a route for future work on
extending and improving our framework, and wraps up with a final conclusion.
3
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Chapter 2
Background and Motivation
In this section we will first explain some basic concepts and expressions that are used
in the privacy context such as anonymization operations and Personally Identifiable In-
formation(PII). Then we will have a look at some classic examples of failure to preserve
privacy when data publishing and how these attacks motivated us to choose our topic for
this thesis.
2.1 Concepts and Expressions
In the most basic form of privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP), the data holder has a
table of attributes from the following four categories: Explicit Identifier, Quasi Identifier,
Sensitive Attributes, and Non-Sensitive Attributes [Fung et al., 2010]. A summary of each
category can be found in Table 2.1.
Attribute name Definition Example
Explicit Identifier Explicitly identifies record
owners
Government identity number
(e.g SSN)
Quasi
Identifier(QID)
Potentially identifies record
owners
Birth date and gender
Sensitive Attributes Sensitive information about
a person
Income, disability status
Non-Sensitive
Attributes
All other attributes Favorite band
Table 2.1: Table of basic categories of database attributes
From these categories, it would be easy to think that Personally Identifiable Informa-
tion (PII) would only be found in the first attribute. As we will see in the next section, this
is not the case. Recent privacy laws have defined PII in a much broader way. They account
5
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for the possibility of deductive disclosure and do not lay down a list of attributes that con-
stitutes as PII. For example, the European Parliament made a set of directives known as the
Data Protection Directive, in which personal data is defined as: ”any information relating
to an [...] natural person [...] who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular
by reference [...] to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural, or social identity”‘[European Parliament, 2006].
In order to remove any PII from a data set, it needs to go through a process called
anonymization. This constitutes a series of manipulations with the ultimate end goal of
protecting the privacy of the data set’s participants.Fung et al. [2010] operates with a num-
ber of five basic operations which might be applied for this purpose. These operations are
briefly described in Table 2.2.
Anonymization
Operation
Definition
Generalization Replaces the value with more general value, such as a mean
value
Suppression Replaces the value with a special value, indicating that the
replaced values are not disclosed
Anatomization De-associates the relationship between the quasi-identifier and
sensitive information
Permutation Partitions a set of data records into groups and shuffles their
sensitive values
Perturbation Replace the original value with a synthetic value that keep the
statistical characteristics
Table 2.2: Table of anonymization operations (adapted from Fung et al. [2010] )
2.2 Privacy Breaches
In the recent years there have been many failures in privacy preserving data publish-
ing. Many companies have been faced with a PR disaster after releasing data about
their customers thinking that they had been properly anonymized, only to have people
de-anonymize their data and breaching the privacy of the data sets’ participants. In this
section we will have a look at some of these privacy failures.
2.2.1 Netflix prize competition
Netflix, the world’s largest online movie streaming website, decided in 2006 to crowd-
source a new movie suggestion algorithm and offered a cash prize of 1 million dollar for
the most efficient algorithm. To help the research, they released 100 million supposedly
anonymized movie ratings from their own database. In order to protect the privacy of their
users, Netflix removed all user level information; such as name, username, age, geographic
location, browser used, etc. They also deliberately perturbed ”some of the rating data for
some customers[...] in one or more of the following ways: deleting ratings; inserting
alternative ratings and dates, and modifying random dates”[Bell and Koren, 2007]. The
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released data records included an anonymized user ID, movie name, date of rating, and the
user rating of that movie on a scale from 1 to 5.
Two researchers from the University of Texas,Narayanan and Shmatikov [2008], demon-
strated that an adversary who knows only a little bit about an individual subscriber can
easily identify this subscriber’s record in the data set. Using the publicly available data
set from the Internet Movie Database (IMDB) as the source of background knowledge,
they matched certain subscribers with their Netflix records, and uncovered their apparent
political preferences and other potentially sensitive information. The paper also offered
a formal mathematical treatment of how a small amount of auxiliary knowledge about an
individual can be used to do a fairly reliable re-identification. In the case of the Netflix
data set, the authors [Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008] found that with only 8 movie rat-
ings, 99% of the records could be uniquely identified. Furthermore, they proved that the
de-anonymization algorithm they employed is robust to discrepancies in the rating and
dates.
2.2.2 Group Insurance Commission
In 1997, Latanya Sweeney wrote a paper on how she had identified the medical records
of Massachussets governor William Weld based on publicly available information from
the database of Group Insurance Commission. She achieved this analyzing data from a
public voter list, and linked it with patient-specific medical data through a combination
of birth date, zip code, and gender[Sweeney, 2002]. As these columns were similar in
both databases, their combination could be used to identify medical records that belong
to either one person, or a small group of people. Sweeney hypothesized that 87% of the
US population could be identified by having the combination of the three aforementioned
records. It’s worth noting here that this theory is not conclusive. A paper by Daniel Barth-
Jones suggests that the re-identification of Weld may have been a fluke due to his public
figure, and that ordinary people risk of identification is much lower[Barth-Jones, 2012].
2.2.3 New York Taxi data set
The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission released a data set in 2013 containing
details about every taxi ride that year, including pickup and drop-off times, location, fare,
as well as anonymized (hashed) versions of the taxi’s license and medallion numbers.
Vijay Pandurangan, a researcher for Google, wrote a blog-post where he showed how he
exploited a vulnerability in the hashing-function to re-identify the drivers. He then showed
how this could be potentially used to calculate any driver’s personal income[Pandurangan,
2014].
Another researcher, called Anthony Tockar, wrote an article during his internship at
Neustar Research where he proved that the data set also contained an inherent privacy
risk to the passengers which had been riding New York Taxis. Even though there was no
information in the data set on who had been riding the taxis, Tockar showed that by using
auxiliary information such as timestamped pictures, he could stalk celebrities and figure
out to where they were driving, and how much they tipped the driver. He also used map
data from Google Maps to create a map of drop-off locations for people that had exited
a late night visit from gentleman’s club and taken a cab home. He then used websites
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like Spokeo and Facebook to find the cab customers’ ethnicity, relationship status, court
records, and even a profile picture[Tockar, 2014].
2.3 Privacy Breach Through Linkage Attacks
In each of the examples in the previous section, the privacy breach was achieved through
an attack model called linkage attacks. These types of attacks are characterized that they
create a decision rule which link at least one data entry in the anonymized data set with
public information which contain individual identifiers, given that the probability of these
two matching exceeds a selected confidence threshold.
In the literature[Bonchi and Ferrari, 2010; Fung et al., 2010], they broadly classify the
attack models into two categories: Record linkage and attribute linkage. In both these
types of attack, we need to assume that the attacker knows the QID of the victim.
2.3.1 Record linkage
In the case of attribute linkage, some quasi-identifier value QID identifies a small number
of records in the original data set, which are called a group. If the victim’s QID is the
same, he or she is then vulnerable to being linked to this much smaller number of records
in the group. With the help of some additional information, there is then a chance that the
attacker could uniquely identify the victim’s records in the group. This is what happened to
governor William Weld as mentioned in Section 2.2.2. Sweeney linked medical data with
a voter list, which both included the QID= <Zip,Birth date,Sex >. She then employed the
background knowledge that governor Weld was admitted to the hospital at the certain date,
which allowed her to uniquely identify him from the small group of people that shared the
same QID as him.
Sweeney [2002] proposed a notion called k-anonymity in order to try and prevent
record linkage through QID. She defined that a table T with a quasi-identifier QIT would
satisfy k-anonymity if and only if each sequence of values T [QIT ] appears with at least
k occurrences in T [QIT ]. From that definition it appears that k-anonymity is designed to
prevent record linkage through hiding the record of the victim in a big group of records
with the same QID. This method has a weakness however, as an attacker can still infer a
victim’s sensitive attribute, such as having the attribute hasDisease=true, if most records
in a group have similar values on those sensitive values.
2.3.2 Attribute linkage
The aforementioned weakness is an example of an attribute linkage attack. An attacker
might not be able to precisely identify the victim through a record, but can still infer his
or her sensitive values from the published data. The attacker does this based on the set of
sensitive values associated to the group the victim belongs to.
To prevent this type of attack,Machanavajjhala et al. [2007] proposed an idea based
on diminishing the correlation between the QID attributes and the sensitive values, which
they called l-diversity. The method requires each group with similar QID to have l distinct
values for the sensitive attributes.
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2.4 Challenges in Data Privacy
Several studies have been performed to assess which privacy risks exists in fields such
as mobile applications citations, health care data, and in social networks, and all of them
found deficiencies in either the collection or handling of individuals’ data. A study run
by the European Data Protection Authorities (DPA) found that out of 1211 mobile appli-
cations surveyed, 59% caused concern with respect to pre-installation privacy communi-
cations, and that 31% requested permissions exceeding what the surveyors would expect
based on their understanding of the applications functionalityDPA [2014].
The law might not necessarily be enough to sufficiently prevent the misuse of person-
ally sensitive information, such as patient’s health care data. A study performed by Yale’s
center for bioethics concluded that: ”Law likely cannot catch up with burgeoning data
collection, data aggregation, and data mining activities, nor with technological advance,
let alone adequately anticipate it.” Yet the author also argued that technological progress
would lead to ”Better alternatives to identification and de-identification; means of tracking
data; [...] improved data security; and returning benefit to data originators”Kaplan [2014].
2.5 Motivation
During the fall of 2014, we performed a systematic mapping review on the subject of real-
time machine learning on data streams. In this report we investigated a massive amount of
research literature written in this field, and found that many state-of-the-art solutions are
focusing on making their solutions both distributed and scalable[Asplund and Frøystad,
2014]. Combining this with our strong advocacy for the need for stronger privacy solu-
tions, we came up with a research goal of creating our own distributed machine learner
which could provide a strong privacy guarantee.
We hope to show that a competitive solution can be created in a distributed learning
setting, which also can provide a privacy guarantee for the people who supply the data
required for learning. If we are successful, our research can open an avenue of practical
solutions where the paradigm in data mining shifts from collecting data in massive cen-
tralized databases, to a distributed approach where the data producers also become data
owners.
2.5.1 Data security
This project is motivated by the aforementioned challenges and breaches of data privacy,
and wish to contribute to the development of privacy-preserving technology. In a world
where massive amounts of sensitive personal data are being collected, attacks on the indi-
vidual’s privacy are becoming more and more of a threat.
2.5.2 Data ownership
Addtionally, we are strongly motivated by the idea that there should be a reversal in data
ownership. Currently, companies offering services to users collect the data stream gen-
erated by a user and store it centrally in a data center owned by the company. The user
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has to trust that these data centers will not be breached or leaked. Furthermore, the user
has to trust that the company policies or ethical standards will not change in the future
and that the company or their data will not be bought by an independent third party. If
data streams were instead collected in some user-controlled repository, risk of breaches
would be reduced and the user would maintain full access control and monitoring. Tim
Berners-Lee voiced his support for this idea at the IP EXPO in 2014: ”I would like us to
build a world in which I have control of my data. I can sell it to you and we can negotiate
a price, but more importantly I will have legal ownership of all the data about me”[Curtis,
2014]. He also brought up another compelling reason to ensure that users retain the data
they produce:
”In general if you put together all that data, from my wearable, my house,
from other companies like the credit card company and the banks, from all
the social networks, I can give my computer a good view of my life, and I
can use that. That information is more valuable to me than it is to the cloud”
[Hern, 2014]
A user will have multiple applications that gather information from their daily life, such
as exercise, social and office applications. While each of these data streams on their own
can be useful for the companies that collect them, they can have even more powerful uses
when put together to give a more complete context. Instead of each company pulling user
data to their data centers, users could push data stream to their personal storage, and offer
it to a company for a negotiable price. The user then has control of who accesses the data
and how, while also allowing for data analysis across completely separate applications.
2.5.3 Future legal requirements
The European Parliament is working towards new legislation that will create a set of com-
mon data protection rules for all EU member states[European Parliament, 2013]. This
legislation offers right to erasure and right to portability. The matter of portability is a step
in the direction of the ideas of data ownership discussed in Section 2.5.2. Perhaps most
significantly, the regulation requires that all companies operating from the EU or having
customers in the EU will be required to comply with. Companies that do not comply can
risk being imposed periodic data protection audits or fines up to 100 million or 5% of
annual worldwide turnover.
The European Parliament is not alone in looking new laws to regulate data privacy. The
Council to the President, an advisory group to the US President, concluded in their 2014
report [U.S Government, 2014] that preserving privacy values would be their number one
recommendation when designing a new policy framework for big data. Furthermore, the
so called ”Privacy Bill of Rights” outlined by the Obama administration in 2012 is mov-
ing forward, and a new discussion draft was published in 2015[U.S Government, 2015].
Among the requirements put forward in this bill is transparency about how data is used,
the degree of control a person has over how their data is used.
10
Chapter 3
Basic Theory
Common to all the attack vectors described in Section 2.3 is that the attacker rely on back-
ground knowledge, often also called auxiliary information, to perform their linkage at-
tacks. Protecting a database against this threat has long been a major challenge in database
design. Already back in 1977 Tore Dalenius [1977] defined a desideratum for data privacy
which states:
Access to the published data should not enable the adversary to learn anything
extra about target victim compared to no access to the database, even with
the presence of any adversarys background knowledge obtained from other
sources.
This privacy goal was rejected by Cynthia Dwork, who showed the general impossibility
of Dalenius’ goal due to the existence of auxiliary information. Instead she chose to for-
mulate a probabilistic privacy goal, which places an upper bound on how much the risk of
privacy breach can increase by participating in a database.
3.1 Differential Privacy
The term ”differential privacy” was defined by Dwork as a description of a promise, made
by a data holder to a data subject: ”You will not be affected, adversely or otherwise, by
allowing your data to be used in any study or analysis, no matter what other studies, data
sets, or information sources, are available.” [Dwork and Roth, 2013] In an ideal situation,
databases which implement differential privacy mechanisms can make confidential data
widely available for accurate data analysis, without resorting to data usage agreements,
data protection plans, or restricted views. Nevertheless, the Fundamental Law of Infor-
mation Recovery states that overly accurate answers to too many questions will destroy
privacy in a spectacular way [Dwork and Roth, 2013], meaning that data utility will even-
tually be consumed.
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3.1.1 Definition of differential privacy
The classic example for explaining a security breach is the case of Mr White: Suppose
you have access to a database that allows you to compute the income of all residents in
a specified area. If you knew that Mr White was going to move, simply querying the
database before and after his relocation would allow you to deduce his income.
Definition 1. The distance of two data sets, d(D1, D2), denotes the minimum number of
sample changes that are required to change D1 into D2.
Formally, differential privacy is defined as follows: A randomized function M gives
-differential privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2 where d(D1, D2) = 1, and all S ⊆
Range(M),
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e() × Pr[M(D2) ∈ S] (3.1)
That is, the presence or absence of a particular record should not affect the probability
of any given output of M(D) by more than some multiplicative factor.
Informally, the presence or absence of a single record in a database should not have
a noticeable impact on the output of any queries sent to it. Though the existence of the
database itself might allow attackers to learn information about a person, opting out of the
database will not significantly help reduce the risk of information disclosure. Conversely,
participating in the database does not significantly increase the risk of disclosure either,
thus fulfilling Dworks promise quoted in the beginning of Section 3.1.
Privacy preserving data analysis platforms such as PINQ[McSherry, 2009], Airavat[Roy
et al., 2010] and Fuzz[Haeberlen et al., 2011] have all implemented features such as pri-
vacy budgeting and noise mechanisms to compute useful queries while fulfilling Equation
3.1.
3.1.2 Privacy budget
The quotient Pr[M(D1)∈S]Pr[M(D2)∈S] measures the extent to which an attacker can ascertain the dif-
ference between the two data sets[Abowd and Vilhuber, 2008]. Sarathy and Muralidhar
[2011] calls this ratio the ”knowledge gain ratio”. Differential privacy requires that this
ratio is limited to e. This is because as the ratio grows larger, an attacker can determine
with greater probability that the query result was obtained from one data set over the other.
Privacy budgeting was introduced to limit the amount of information a data analyst can
obtain about any individual with data records in the data set. The data analysis platform
will track every query to ensure that both individual queries and aggregation queries do
not exceed the given budget. This privacy standard forbids further queries to the database
once the budget has been consumed.
Defining and depleting a privacy budget is possible due to the sequential composition
property of -differentially private mechanisms, as shown by McSherry [2009]. Given
N mechanisms Mi that offer N -differential privacy, applying each mechanism Mi in se-
quence offers -differentially privacy.
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3.1.3 Noise mechanisms
Given a target function f to compute on a database D, it is necessary to design a random-
ized function M which fulfills Equation 3.1 while yielding a useful approximation to the
true f . This randomized function M can be created by adding noise to the computation of
f . There are many different mechanisms for applying this noise, but the two most common
are the Laplace mechanism and the Exponential mechanism.
Laplace mechanism
The Laplace mechanism involves adding random noise which follows the Laplace statisti-
cal distribution. The Laplace distribution centered around zero has only one parameter, its
scale b, and this is proportional to its standard deviation.
Lap(x|b) = 1
2b
exp(−|x|
b
) (3.2)
When using the Laplace mechanism it is necessary to choose a suitable value for the
parameter b. Increasing values of b results in increased noise variance. The scale of b
is naturally dependent on the privacy parameter , and also on the effect the presence or
absence of a single record can have on the output of function f . This risk is called the
sensitivity of the function, and is defined mathematically as:
∆f = max
D1,D2
||f (D1 )− f (D2 )||1 (3.3)
Figure 3.1: Probability distributions of the Laplace mechanism for two neighboring databases.
(Adapted from [Hsu et al., 2014])
This equation states that the sensitivity ∆f is the maximum difference in the values
that the function f may take on any pair of databases that differ on only one row. Dwork
proved that adding a noise drawn from Lap(∆f/) to a query, -differential privacy is
guaranteed[Dwork and Roth, 2013].
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Exponential mechanism
The exponential mechanism proposed by McSherry and Talwar [2007] is a method for
selecting one element from a set, and is commonly used if a non-numeric value query is
used. An example would be: ”What is the most common eye color in this room?”. Here
it would not make sense to perturb the answer by adding noise drawn from the Laplace
distribution. The idea of the exponential mechanism is to select the output from all the
possible answers at random, with the probability of selecting a particular output being
higher for those outputs that are ”closer” to the true output.
More formally, let A be the range of of possible outputs for the query function f . Also,
let uf (D, a) be a utility function that measures how good an output a ∈ A is as an answer
to the query function f given that the input data set is D (Note that higher values of uf
represents better outputs). The sensitivity function will then be defined as the maximum
possible change in the utility function’s value uf due to the addition or removal of one
person’s data from the input, i.e:
Definition 4: the sensitivity of score function uf is defined as
S(uf ) = max
d(D1,D2)=1,a∈A
||uf (D1, a)− uf (D2, a)|| (3.4)
‘
3.2 Multi-Party Logistic Regression With Differential Pri-
vacy
3.2.1 Logistic regression
The logistic regression model is
p(y = 1|x, θ) = 1
1 + exp(−θT x) (3.5)
where θ is the parameter vector we wish to learn. It can be used for predicting the prob-
ability of a binary outcome or binary classification by setting a classification threshold.
Given a training set we choose the θ with the largest likelihood, the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE)[Elkan, 2014]. The likelihood of parameter θ is
m∏
i=1
p(yi|xi, θ) (3.6)
For convenience, the point of maximum log-likelihood is used instead. Since the log
function is monotonically increasing, the maximum likelihood estimator and the maximum
log conditional likelihood estimator is the same, assuming labels yi are independent of
each other when conditioned on their respective feature vectors xi. We then select
θMLE = arg max
θ
[
m∑
i=1
log p(yi|xi, θ)]− λ‖θ‖22 (3.7)
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where the term λ‖θ‖22 is a regularization term to restrict the magnitude of θ and avoid
overfitting the training data. Using λ > 0 gives a regularized estimate of w which often has
superior generalization performance, especially when the dimensionality is high (Nigam
et al., 1999).
3.2.2 Stochastic gradient descent
We find the point of maximum log-likelihood by mini-batch stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) of the regularized objective. In normal batch gradient descent, the gradient is com-
puted by computing an error sum over the full data set for each gradient step. This can be
very time consuming for larger data sets. In single instance SGD, each gradient descent
step is calculated using only a single training instance. This gives noisy gradient steps,
but has the advantage of being able to converge without doing a full pass through the data
set. If convergence is not achieved after a single pass, SGD can do multiple passes over
the data set if needed. This makes SGD more adaptable to varying data set sizes than full
batch gradient descent.
Mini-batch SGD is a trade-off between the basic batch gradient descent and single
instance SGD[Cotter et al., 2011]. The data set is divided into |D|/b batches of size b, and
a gradient step is taken for each batch. Given mini-batch SGD, the rule for updating each
dimension j of θ given a single batch of size b becomes
Update rule
θt+1j = θ
t
j + α[
b∑
i=1
(yi − p(yi|xi, θ))xij − 2λ‖θtj‖] (3.8)
As in regular SGD, multiple passes over the data set are performed as necessary. A
single, full pass over the data set is called an epoch. As stated by Cotter et al. [2011],
an adaptive learning rate that decreases sufficiently over time is necessary for existing
theoretical proofs of SGD convergence. We use the adaptive learning rate used in the SGD
implementation by Bottou [2011], which relies on results in [Xu, 2011].
α =
γ
1 + γλt
(3.9)
where λ is the regularization constant, t is the current epoch and γ is a parameter used
to tune the adaptive learning rate. Note that this means that we do not need to search for
suitable values of the learning rate α - instead, we must identify a suitable γ.
Convergence criteria
While we have defined a maximum number of epochs for the stochastic gradient de-
scent, convergence to a near-optimal parameter vector might occur well before this limit
is reached. To save time, we used a convergence criteria to stop optimization when the
improvement in the objective function is sufficiently small. The optimization terminates
when the change in the objective function after a gradient step is less than 0.01.
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3.2.3 Sensitivity of logistic regression aggregation mechanism
In order to build logistic regression models in a privacy-preserving manner, it is necessary
to determine the sensitivity of the output model. Chaudhuri and Monteleoni [2009] showed
that the sensitivity of logistic regression is at most
2
nλ
(3.10)
where n is the size of the training set and λ is the regularization parameter used in model
training.
This solves only the case of training a privacy-preserving logistic regression model on
local data. Our research goal involves any number of peers cooperating to build useful
models without compromising the privacy of their local data. Pathak et al. [2010] pro-
posed an approach where locally trained logistic regression classifiers are aggregated by
averaging. Secrecy is achieved by using an homomorphic encryption method to compute
the aggregate classifier, ensuring that local data is not shared while allowing a differen-
tially private model to be published. This encrypted computation method is presented in
more detail in Section 3.6. It is important to note that the approach of Pathak et al. [2010]
assumes that the participants are honest-but-curious. This assumption means that partici-
pants will follow the established protocol, but will read any information that is somehow
available to it. Their method is not robust against malicious sabotage.
When aggregating K locally trained models, their approach computes the final model
θ =
1
K
K∑
j=1
θj + η (3.11)
where η is a noise vector that guarantees -differential privacy. This noise vector is drawn
from the Laplace distribution with parameter 2njλ , where nj is the size of the smallest
data set used in training of the K models. This means that they use a bound on output
sensitivity of
∆θˆs =
2
njλ
(3.12)
which is the same as in Equation 3.10, except that the lowest nj is used. Since the lowest
nj corresponds to the highest noise variance, this gives protection to all the participants
regardless of the size of their data set.
It is important to note that this does not offer full protection to participants. It only
offers differential privacy guarantee for individual records in their data set. This means
that aggregate information about a participants data set will be incorporated in the learned
models. Sufficient knowledge about the other di6=k data sets would allow a third party to
learn information about the user. For example, an individual might not want insurance
companies to know about the averages of features in their biometric records. The current
system would not help with that concern - it only protects against specific knowledge about
individual biometric records.
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As stated by Dwork, groups of records can be protected Dwork [2006]. Dwork points
out that the end goal of differential privacy is allow learning aggregate information in a
way that privacy. By this she means that it is inherent in the task at hand that aggregate
information must be preserved somehow. While this point stands, we suggest an approach
in Section 9.6 that could allow full protection of even the aggregate information of users
in our setting, while allowing model training on their data. In this project, we only protect
the individual records held by each user.
3.3 Ensemble Learning
In ensemble learning, the predictions of individually trained models are combined to form
a final prediction[Opitz and Maclin, 1999]. In this project we will be using a variant
of ensemble learning called bootstrap aggregating or bagging, as presented by Breiman
[1996]. Breiman proved that when changes in the training set have a significant effect on
the trained model, bagging can give better performance than training a single model on the
learning set. Bootstrap aggregating involves creating new learning sets by sampling from
the original set with replacement, and training a model on each new set produced. These
models are all added to the ensemble, which then makes predictions by taking a majority
vote.
We did not strictly use bagging according to its formal definition, as the bootstrap step
was not used. In our approach models are instead trained on disjoint subsets of the training
set, which are then published after being aggregated according to Equation 3.11. There
can be many such models published, so they are added to ensembles and prediction is done
in the same fashion as in bagging.
3.4 Cross-validation
We initially divided the data sets into a training set and a testing set, the latter being
intended to evaluate the performance and properties of our approach. We needed to ex-
plore many different combinations and variations of our experiment during, but the test set
should only be used as a final step. If the test set is used for repeated validation of different
parameters, we would risk overfitting it and getting unrealistic test results.
One way to do reliable accuracy estimation is with cross-validation, which makes more
efficient use of training data than creating a separate holdout set and has less bias than as
shown by Kohavi [1995]. Cross-validation involves partitioning the training set into K
disjoint sets. Then, for each t ∈ [1,K] partition t is used as the test set, and the remain-
ing partitions are combined to form the training set. Accuracy is reported as number of
correctly classified instances divided by the total number of instances over all K partitions.
Kohavi recommends 10-fold stratified cross-validation. Stratified cross-validation in-
volves ensuring that each fold has the same class distribution as the original data set. Since
the data sets we tested with have thousands of records and close to uniform class distribu-
tion, we concluded that stratified folds was not necessary. Our experiments were evaluated
with 10-fold cross validation with each fold being a random, disjoint subset of the training
set.
17
Chapter 3. Basic Theory
3.5 Programming Frameworks Used
3.5.1 JADE
To minimize the risk of errors we wanted to implement the experiment in such a way that it
was easy to reason about the behavior of the components and identify mistakes. Since the
core of our experiment involves peers communicating and cooperating to create predictive
models, we decided an agent-based model was suitable.
The Java Agent framework for Distance learning Environments(JADE) is a middleware
which facilitates the development of multi-agent systems. An application based on JADE
is made of a set of components called agents, where each one has an unique name. Agents
execute tasks and interact by exchanging messages between each other. Agents execute
on top of a platform that provides them with basic services such as message delivery. A
platform is composed of one or more containers, where the containers can be executed
on different hosts thus achieving a distributed platform. The Main container is a special
container which exists in the platform, as it has two special properties. 1: It must be
the first container to start in the platform, and all other containers must register to it. 2:
Two special agents are included; the Agent Management System (AMS) which represents
the single authority in the platform, and is an agent tasked with platform management
actions such as starting and killing other agents. The other special agent is the Directory
Facilitator (DF), which provides a directory which announces which agents are available
on the platform. This acts like a yellow pages service where agents can publish the services
they provide and find other agents providing services they need.
Note that while all containers in a single platform must register with the Main container
in that platform, multiple Jade platforms can be instantiated separately and communicate
with each other, allowing for scalability of Jade deployments.
Details of our implementation can be found in Section 5.2.
3.6 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is an encryption scheme which allows computations to be car-
ried out on ciphertext, meaning plaintext that has been encrypted using an algorithm and
a public key. The result of the computations is also encrypted, and can be deciphered
back to plaintext using a private key. This has long been considered crypthography’s
holy grail [Micciancio, 2010], as this would allowing operating on encrypted text with-
out knowing the decryption key. For example, given ciphertexts C1 = Enc(Data1) and
C2 = Enc(Data2), an additively homomorphic encryption scheme would allow to com-
bine C1 and C2 to obtainEncK(Data1+Data2). More concretely this means that if you
encrypt your data using such an encryption scheme, you can transfer your data to an un-
trusted server which can perform some arbitrary computations on that data without being
able to decrypt the data itself.
Up until recently, all published homomorphic encryption schemes only supported one
basic operation, most commonly addition. These schemes could only be called partially
homomorphic, as they did not provide any extensive functionality. The notion of a fully
homomorphic encryption schemes was first proposed by Rivest et al. [1978], but it wasn’t
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realized until 2009 when Craig Gentry published a doctoral thesis where he proved that he
had constructed a fully homomorphic schemeGentry [2009]. Gentry’s solution was based
on ”ideal lattices” as well as a method to double-encrypt the data in such a way that the
errors could be handled ”behind the scenes”. By periodically unlocking the inner layer of
encryption underneath an outer layer of scrambling, the computer could hide and recover
from errors without ever analyzing the secret data.
The downside of Gentry’s two-layered approach is that it requires a massive compu-
tational effort. Bruce Schneier, a leading American cryptographer, pointed out ”Gentry
estimates that performing a Google search with encrypted keywords – a perfectly reason-
able simple application of this algorithm – would increase the amount of computing time
by about a trillion. Moore’s law calculates that it would be 40 years before that homomor-
phic search would be as efficient as a search today, and I think he’s being optimistic with
even this most simple of examples[Schneier, 2009].”
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Related Work
In this chapter we will present some of the existing work related to our thesis and research
goals. The papers referenced in this chapter are naturally also related to this thesis’ con-
stituent papers. We have chosen to mention papers that are related to one or more of the
major theoretical framework we have employed. This chapter will therefore be structured
in three sections: the first introduces both the main theoretical contributions to the concept
of differential privacy, and a survey of the research field. The second section explores some
centralized approaches to machine learning with differential privacy guarantees. The third
and last section explore and compare works that have employed a distributed approach
similar to our own framework.
4.1 Differential Privacy
As mentioned in Chapter 3, differential privacy was defined by Cynthia Dwork in her sem-
inal work published in 2006 [Dwork, 2006]. This paper lay the mathematical foundations
for the privacy guarantee we employ in our work. Dwork later expounded on her work in
the book Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy[Dwork and Roth, 2013], which
we used as a main piece of reference when gathering knowledge in the early phases of this
thesis project.
Other defining works include the two papers written by Frank McSherry. His work
on mechanism design [McSherry and Talwar, 2007] allowed for the expansion of Dwork’s
Laplacian mechanism design, by providing the theoretical analysis that other mechanisms
could satisfy the same guarantee (see section 3.1.3 for more). His paper [McSherry, 2009]
on the design and implementation of PINQ were hugely influential in the early phases of
our project, as we could use the paper and the publicly available code for reference when
implementing our own design.
Although our own work does not include an extensive literary survey on differential
privacy, we have leaned extensively on the recent survey performed by Ji et al. [2014b].
This work review the current differential privacy research on various forms of machine
learning problems, both supervised and unsupervised. Their conclusion that adding noise
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to the target function a single time was much preferable to adding noise multiple times
during the training process, helped give us direction during the early phases of our project.
4.2 Centralized Approaches
In the years following the release of Dwork’s seminal paper there have been a steadily
increasing amount of publications, reaching a peak in 2013 with 141 papers published and
indexed by the Scopus scientific database. Some of these works have focused on the same
area as us, namely classification using logistic regression, but instead opted to focus on
a centralized approach. Mentioned below are the work which have either influenced our
own, or perfomed similar experiments.
Chaudhuri and Monteloni designed a logistic regression algorithm which guaranteed
differential privacy in 2009. They also provided a mathematical proof for the upper bound
of the sensitivity of logistic regression (see Section 3.2.3), which formed the basis of our
own solution. The same authors provided a follow-up paper[Chaudhuri et al., 2011], in
which they further developed a method called object perturbation to add noise to the reg-
ularized objective function. Their results which showed that objective perturbation is gen-
erally superior to output perturbation has proved very useful to the field of differential
privacy.
Zhang et al. [2012] further improved upon Chaudhuri’s work by creating a new func-
tional mechanism for objective perturbation, which they tested on a set of census data by
employing both linear and logistic regression.
4.3 Distributed Approaches
As our research goal states, we wish to create a framework to test the feasibility of em-
ploying a distributed, differentially private learner. One of the first works in this field
was performed by Pathak et al. [2010], who proposed a privacy-preserving protocol for
composing a differentially private aggregate classifier. Their protocol trained classifiers
locally in different parties, and the parties would then interact with an curator through a
homomorphic encryption scheme to create a perturbed aggregate classifier. We took in-
spiration from their protocol when we created our own ensemble classifier, extending the
work of Pathak et al. in several ways. We’ve taken steps to ensure better scalability by
adding better group forming for each of the peers, and we’ve added an publishing step
to the aggregation mechanism which allows for the creation of an ensemble classifier in
each peer. Lastly we’ve also performed more extensive experiments to validate the em-
ployed method, as Pathak et al. seemed to have focused more on the theoretical side of the
experimentation.
Since the work of Pathak et al was presented in 2010 there have been some research
published on how to create private distributed learners. One such example is the work of
Boutet et al. [2013], who presented a privacy-preserving distributed collaborative filtering
scheme which relied on user profile obfuscation and randomized response. Another inter-
esting paper is the work of Zhang et al. [2014], which investigate mechanisms to sanitize
location data used in recommendation system with the help of differential privacy.
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Rajkumar and Agarwal [2012] presented an alternative to Pathak’s method in 2012. It
works in a multiparty setting by using a stochastic gradient descent based procedure to di-
rectly optimize the overall multiparty objective rather than Pathak’s method of combining
classifiers learned from optimizing local objectives. Their algorithm achieves a slightly
weaker form of differential privacy than that of Pathak et al., but is more robust to the
number of parties and the relative fractions of data owned by the different parties.
Ji et al. [2014a] recently proposed a distributed solution using logistic regression,
which learned from both private and publicly available medical data sets. Their solu-
tion differ from our own as they employ a globally synchronized structure, whereas our
own solution works asynchronously. They also design a mechanism which first uses pub-
lic data sets to compute the gradient without any form of noise addition, and then perform
a distributed logistic regression step with differential privacy.
As part of an ongoing research project Eigner et al. [2014] published a paper presenting
PrivaDA, a novel design architecture for distributed differential privacy which supports
a variety of perturbation mechanisms. The system leverages recent advances in secure
multiparty computations and claims to generate noise in a fully distributed manner while
maintaining the optimal utility. As this research is ongoing, they only demonstrate the
viability of their approach through theoretical analysis, but their performance reviews seem
to indicate promising future work. From what we can entail from this paper, their research
seems to be very similar to our own but much more extensive in nature. They have not yet
posted any detailed results from performing any machine learning experiments, so we can
not compare output at this time. It could definitely be interesting for future work to create
some form of collaboration with this team.
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Design of Experiments
5.1 Overview
As stated in Section 1.1, we wanted to create and test an architecture that facilitates fully
decentralized machine learning in a way that maintains the privacy of the participants.
We consider a setting with N peers that each have a local data set. These data sets are
assumed to be independently sampled for each peer, but may be sampled from the same
distribution. When the system initializes, each peer trains a logistic regression model on
its local data set. The data set and the trained model is private and should only be known
by its owner.
While the output of each mechanism described in Section 3.2.3 is an average of the
input models, produced in way that guarantees differential privacy, the computation it-
self must be done in a centralized manner. Doing this securely is achieved by using the
protocol detailed by Pathak et al., which uses homomorphic encryption to compute the ag-
gregate model without allowing any of the participants to know the original private model
of another participant[Pathak et al., 2010]. Since this protocol requires some central com-
putation, one of the peers is chosen at random to be the curator, responsible for acting as
the central party described in the solution by Pathak et al. The other peers in the group will
submit the necessary information to this curator, including their private model, in an en-
crypted fashion. Once the peer acting as curator has received a model from all participants,
it computes the average model, adds sufficient noise to guarantee -differential privacy and
publishes the final result. The scope of this publish step can vary. In our experiments we
have tested one version that publishes a model to all available peers and one that only
publishes the model to the peers in the group that helped create it.
Each peer holds a privacy budget, as discussed in Section 3.1.2 , that limits how many
times it can be involved in a mechanism application. If the budget of a peer is depleted, it
is no longer a candidate for the randomly formed aggregation groups. When the number
of peers available have decreased to an amount where there are not enough peers to form
a group with the size specified, the experiment terminates.
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5.1.1 Limitations of current implementation
Certain parts of the system outlined in the previous section are not implemented in this
project, and were replaced by black-box substitutes that simulate the required behavior.
We have only done this for components that are already described and tested in other
work.
The protocol created by Pathak et al. for computing aggregates securely was not imple-
mented. In our implementation models are sent unencrypted to the peer acting as curator.
While this part would need to be replaced with a full implementation of the approach by
Pathak et al., the output returned by the curator is exactly the same, using the computation
in Equation 3.11.
Finally, the selection of random groups is done in a non-scalable manner. A centralized
actor that has full knowledge of all participating peers randomly selects groups of these
peers and sends a message to each peer with the list of participants. This should be replaced
by a decentralized method for the system to be scalable. How we intend to do this is
discussed further in Section 9.6 on Future Work.
5.2 Architecture
We designed a distributed system using the JADE framework. The core component in this
system is a PeerAgent, which represents a participant in the distributed learning setting.
This agent contains what would be the local data of a person using some application. In the
remaining sections, whenever we say ”peer” we are refering to the PeerAgent described
here, holding a local data set and with means of communcating with other PeerAgent
instances.
To form aggregate models it is necessary to select groups of peers to create each model.
In our experiment, this is implemented with a singleton agent we named the GroupAgent.
This agent draws random subset of size g from the set of all peers. The size and number of
groups formed is given by parameters selected at the beginning of the experiment, which
are described in detail in Section 5.4.
As stated in Section 5.1, the experiment terminates when there no longer exist a suf-
ficient amount of active peers to form a group. That is, when the number of peers with
sufficient budget is less than the group size parameter, the experiment is stopped. This
behavior was implemented into an agent we named CompletionAgent. This agent listens
to messages from the curators in the different groups. Once it has received message of the
creation of the expected number of aggregated models, it initiates the final step of the ex-
periment. This includes testing performance metrics and preparing the JADE environment
for the next experiment.
5.3 Dataset and Preprocessing Steps
This section will introduce the data sets we have used for analysis. Each section introduces
a data set, and details what features it contains, what we try to learn and classify, and why
we chose to use it.
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Each data set was divided into a training set partitioned among the peers in the system,
and a testing set not used until the very end of our project. The test sets were used to
verify the results observed throughout cross-validated experimentation. How the test set
was selected is specified later for each data set. A feature with constant value 1.0 was
appended to all data records before fitting models, to act as the intercept or bias term.
When necessary we scaled the features of the data sets to 0-1 range. This is due to the
proof in [Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009] which states the assumption |Xi| ≤ 1. The
scaling was done by the formula
Xnorm =
X −Xmin
Xmax −Xmin (5.1)
Xmin and Xmax were calculated using only the training set of each data set, to avoid
leaking information about the test set into the training set. The test sets were then scaled
in the same manner using the same Xmin and Xmax as calculated on the training set.
This is a potential source of unrealistic information leakage. In a real implementation,
globally determining scaling on the training set would be difficult. Instead, it might be nec-
essary to perform this scaling locally at each peer. This means that the scaling constants
Xmin and Xmax would be at least somewhat different for each peer, and would only be
calculated on their particular partition of the training set. We performed the scaling glob-
ally on the training set because we believe any effect from this to be small. In particular,
we believe it does not detract from the conclusions we make that are the most relevant to
our research question, which relates to usefulness of model aggregation and any options
we identify to reduce standard deviation across the peer population.
5.3.1 Spambase
The Spambase data set Hopkins et al. [1999] was used as a baseline training set. This data
set is publicly available from the UCI machine learning directory, and contains 57 input
attributes of continuous format which serves as input features for spam detection and 1
target attribute in discrete format which represents the class.
We chose this data set as it is a popular data set to analyze the performance of binary
classifiers, so that we could compare the results of other logistic regression classifiers
against our own. While this data set might not seem like the ideal choice for testing a
differentially private classifier due to its lack of grouped personal information, we argue
that it still fits well for the purpose of demonstration. In a spam-classifying system based
on our distributed model, a logistic regression model can be built by training it locally in
each user’s personal mail folder and then aggregated into an ensemble. That way you can
build a diverse spam-classifier without the users having to give up their personal email to
a centralized database.
We randomly partitioned this data set into a training set and a test set, with 80% of the
records in the training set and the remaining 20% in the test set.
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5.3.2 Adult
As we needed a larger data set to enable us to scale the amounts of peers in the experi-
ments, we chose to use the Adult data set from the UCI machine learning repository. It
consists of personal information records extracted from the US census database and the
task is to predict whether a given person has an annual income over or under $50,000. The
original Adult data set has six continuous and eight categorical features. We downloaded
the data set pre-processed by Platt [1999], where the continuous features are discretized
into quintiles, and each quintile is represented by a binary feature. Each categorical fea-
ture is converted to as many binary features as its cardinality. The data set contains 32,561
training and 16,281 test instances each with 14 features.
This data set is very popular to use in various machine learning experiments, ranking
second on the download list for the UCI machine learning repository. This data set has
also been used before in research in privacy research, most notably in the work by Pathak
et al. [2010]. This has given us some baselines to compare our own results against, which
can be found in Chapter 7
5.3.3 SUSY
The SUSY dataset [Whiteson, 2014] was produced as a benchmark classification task
where the goal is to distinguish between a signal process which produces supersymmetric
particles and a background process which does not. This data set is available from the
UCI machine learning repository, where the data set was preprocessed to extract the 18
high level features. It contains exactly 5,000,000 data records, where 10% is designated as
a test set. We did not use this particular test set. We down-sampled the data set to 100,000
records, and generated a training set from 80% of this subset and a test set from 20% of
this subset.
We employed this data set as it had a sufficient number of records, and this allowed us
to run experiments where the peers had the necessary amount of data available. Since it
was already preprocessed, it was easy to put to use, which also was a big motivating factor
when we decided to employ it. The classification task is however not of much value for
our project, so we mostly used this data set to confirm the results we saw from the other
two data sets.
5.4 Parameter Description
The number of peers, P , specifies how many different peers participate in the experiment,
and necessarily the number of partitions of the training data sets. The training set is divided
into P parts of equal size.
Aggregate models are created from local models at each peer through an aggregation
process that is performed one or more times with subsets of peers. The parameter g spec-
ifies how many peers will participate in a single model aggregation. Since each peer has
a unique subset of data, this parameter determines how many partitions of the training set
contribute to the published aggregate models. These data partitions are not directly used in
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training published models, but rather indirectly through the aggregation of models trained
locally on each partition.
The privacy parameter  determines the level of privacy required for each peer and its
set of data. Note that this parameter does not apply to the original training set as a whole;
each peer has its own private database, which is protected by -differential privacy.
Each peer will get n number of records. This parameter will obviously have a signifi-
cant effect on how well the local model each peer creates is able to generalize to new data
instances.
Each peer trains a local logistic regression classifier on its data partition. This requires
selection of an adaptive learning rate parameter α, a regularization constant λ and a max-
imum number of epochs of stochastic gradient descent. We tuned α by running 3-fold
cross-validation where each peer fits its local model to identify the best γ by powers of 10
in the range [10−2, 102]. When using SGD with adaptive learning rate, this range proved
sufficient to find classifiers that were as good as our best baseline throughout experimenta-
tion. 3-fold cross-validation was chosen because of time constraints on the project. Each
experiment in its entirety is tested with 10-fold cross-validation, so it was necessary to
reduce local model training time in order to run in a reasonably short time on a single
computer.
In normal data mining applications the regularization λ would be tuned in this manner
as well, but in our case the sensitivity of the aggregation mechanism depends on λ, as seen
in Equation 3.12. This means that the peers will have to communicate to either agree on
a regularization level or to determine the smallest regularization constant to identify the
worst case noise level. In our experiments we chose a global regularization level, which
was used by all peers. We identified the best λ by testing a coarse grid of powers of 2 in the
range [2−8, 28] whenever we tested with a new data set or the number of records owned
by each peer changed. If several values of λ presented similar prediction performance
results, we chose the highest value. This is motivated by both a desire to have each model
generalize as well as possible to future data instances, and the fact that lower values of
regularization increases the noise added in model aggregation.
When we wanted to test a new number of records per peer R or the privacy level , we
re-tuned λ to ensure that it had the optimal value. This is necessary, since a lower number
of records can mean that higher regularization is necessary. Additionally, a lower value
of  increases the variance of noise added to the aggregated models. This effect can be
mitigated by increasing regularization, though the model will be unable to fit well to data
if the regularization is too strong.
The manner in which we choose λ should be considered a bit of an optimistic ap-
proach. In reality, global cross-validation to determine best regularization is not practical
and would create challenges with the privacy guarantees. Since we mostly experimented
with less than 100 peers, we believe our global cross-validation is reasonable close to an
approach where peers cooperate to pick the strongest possible λ with acceptable perfor-
mance on average.
Finally, the parameter  can be divided across several applications of the aggregation
mechanism, as described in Section 3.1.2. This was achieved with a per-aggregation pa-
rameter A. Each data partition can participate in the aggregation mechanism n times,
where n× A ≤ .
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5.5 Validation
The test sets were created as described in Section 5.3. These test sets were set aside and
could not be used when tuning and evaluating our solution. In order to explore the ef-
fects of the various parameters we used cross-validation with number of folds n = 10.
For a given combination of parameters, performance metrics were measured as their av-
erage across ten repetitions. In repetition i, data fold i was used as validation set and the
remaining n− 1 data folds were combined to form the test set.
Following the approach outlined in Section 5.4, we established suitable ranges of lo-
gistic regression hyperparameters, before proceeding to testing with different levels of
privacy, peer numbers, group sizes and record numbers. Once we felt confident that we
had established a set of experiments that could answer our research questions, we started
performing the actual experiments. All numbers reported in Chapter 7 are mean measure-
ments on the test set across ten full executions of the experiment, with the training set
being randomized before each iteration.
5.6 Experiment Execution
For each experiment, we selected a single parameter for exploration from the set of pa-
rameters specified in Section 5.4. We wanted to explore the results of the system as the
parameter took a range of values. To start, we specified a range of fixed, scalar values for
each of the parameters. For example, one of the experiments we performed was intended
to test the effect of varying number of peers participating in the system. One possible
parameter combination to test this could then be
P = [10, 20, 30, 40, 50], g = 10, R = 500,  = 0.1, A = 0.1, λ = 1.0
We then perform a full simulation with p peers is repeated and evaluated 10 times,
either by cross-validation or test set, for each p in the specified parameter set P .
5.6.1 The execution of a single experiment
As previously stated, each set of parameters was tested 10 times. For each of these itera-
tions, there is a set of data instances used to train logistic regression models, and a set of
data instances used to quantify the predictive performance of the peers after the number
of aggregations available given a particular combination of P , g,  and A have occurred.
In the following paragraphs we provide more details on the steps we used to perform our
experiments given a set of training and testing instances.
Instantiation
First, the data is shuffled. Shuffling is performed since the manner of which the data is
distributed among the peers, can turn out to have a significant effect on the quality of their
local model. If each peer was given thousands of records these partitions would likely be
fairly uniform, and shuffling the training data would be less important. However, since
we wanted to experiment with data quantities below 100 instances per peer, we expected
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significant variance in the trained models. The data is partitioned into P partitions of equal
size. P instances of PeerAgent are created, and one partition of training instances is given
to each peer.
Fitting local classifiers
Once the environment is set up, all agents are registered and the peers have been given their
data partition, the peers fit a logistic regression model to the data they have been given.
The model fitting is done by mini-batch SGD as described in Section 3.2.2. Each peer
runs 3-fold cross-validation over a single epoch to determine the optimal α, and picks the
α which has the lowest average prediction error on average. When α has been determined,
the logistic regression model is fitted to the peers local data, with the chosen α and the λ
specified for that particular experiment. The fitting is done by running mini-batch SGD
for a maximum of 100 epochs.
Application of aggregation mechanism
After all peers have fitted their local classifiers, the aggregation phase begins. The steps
of this phase is shown in Algorithm 2. The GroupAgent has a list of the peers that still
permit their locally trained classifiers to take part in producing a published, perturbed
model. While there still are enough peers to form a set of size g, the GroupAgent randomly
selects a subset of these peers. Among this subset, it randomly picks one peer to act as the
curator, responsible for performing the steps that result in an aggregated model that can
be published with a differential privacy guarantee. It then sends a message to each of the
selected peers.
Once a PeerAgent is notified that it has been selected to be the curator of a group, it
starts waiting for messages from the other peers in the set. The other g − 1 peers that
are selected to be contributors will send their local classifiers to the curator as soon as
they are notified by the GroupAgent. When the peer acting as curator has received all the
g − 1 models, it applies the aggregation mechanism given in Algorithm 1. It includes its
own local classifier in this step, which produces a final aggregate model from the g other
models. This aggregation mechanism computes the same output that follows from the
approach of Pathak et al. [2010], but does not include the homomorphic encryption steps
that ensure secrecy.
As presented in Section 3.2.3, the sensitivity of logistic regression depends on the sizes
of the data sets used to train the models. Specifically, the mechanism needs to know the
size of the smallest training set in order to guarantee differential privacy. It is important to
note that the method we are testing assumes honest-but-curious participants, as assumed
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by Pathak et al. [2010].
Input:  - privacy parameter;
θ - set of models trained by participating peers;
N - set of peer training set sizes;
λ - regularization level used when training each model in θ;
Output: Perturbed aggregate of the models in M
nmin ← min(N);
η ← Laplace(0; 2nminλ );
modelagg ← 1K
∑|θ|
j=1 θj + η;
return modelagg
Algorithm 1: -differentially private aggregation mechanism
Input: P - the set of peers;
 - privacy parameter;
A - privacy level of a mechanism application;
A - the A-differentially private aggregation mechanism;
g - number of peers in a single mechanism application
for peer ∈ P do
budgetpeer ← ;
end
while |P | ≥ g do
group← randomSample(P, g);
modelagg ← A(group);
for peer ∈ group do
budgetpeer ← budgetpeer − A;
if budgetpeer < A then
P ← P r peer;
end
end
publish(P,modelagg)
end
Algorithm 2: Our application of the aggregation mechanism
Propagation of published models
Originally in our system, aggregated models were only propagated to the peers that had
participated in creating that model, as can be seen in Figure 5.1. What resulted from this,
especially when  was set to a low level such as 0.1 or lower, was that the high amount of
noise made the classifiers have a big standard deviation on their mean classification rate.
This meant that the classifiers could be very accurate in some peers, classifying up towards
90% accuracy, while also being significantly worse in other peers.
We theorized that we could improve the ensemble classifier in each peer if we could
propagate the aggregated models to all the peers in the network, instead of just those who
had participated in making them. Our hypotheses was that this would lead to more sta-
ble classifiers with lower standard deviation, due to a smoothing effect in having more
models in the ensemble classifier in each peer. This is basically the same idea as boot-
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Figure 5.1: One iteration of model aggregation
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strap aggregating, or bagging, which has been proven to lead to improvements in unstable
procedures[Breiman, 1996].
For this reason, we decided to run experiments to compare the different possible meth-
ods of model publication. In all cases, the published models will have been perturbed with
Laplacian noise to give -differential privacy. In the group publication setting, only the
peers that join together to produce a perturbed model will receive the final result. In the
full publication setting, all peers active in the network will receive all perturbed models.
Note that there is no selection or pruning of the ensemble classifier owned by each
peer. If a peer receives a model, it will blindly add it to the ensemble. This means each
peers ensemble model will grow much faster in the full publishing setting, and they will all
contain essentially the same models, the only exception being the unperturbed model pro-
duced by the peer locally. We anticipated that this would lead to a reduction in ensemble
model accuracy variance.
5.6.2 Reset of the experimental environment
Between each execution of the experiment the JADE environment must be prepared for
the next experiment. In our initial implementation we had problems with dynamically
restarting the environment, as it was too slow a method. For this reason, the experiment
environment is reset by simply removing all PeerAgent instances and the GroupAgent.
We still had problems with removing the CompletionAgent quickly enough to allow the
experiments to execute without pause, so instead of removing this agent, we simply reset
its state and reconfigure it with the next experimental setup.
Once the CompletionAgent is reset and the other agents are removed, the environment
is prepared for the next experiment. If all iterations of testing have completed for the par-
ticular combination of parameters, the experiment moves on to the next set of parameters.
If not, the same parameter combination is tested once more.
34
Chapter 6
Experiment Planning and Results
6.1 Experiment Plans
In this section we list the set of experiments we have performed in order to answer the re-
search questions as stated in Section 1.1. In the first section, we list all the experiments and
the parameter configuration we used in each experiment. The results of these experiments
will be provided in section 6.2. When more than one peer was involved in the execution
of an experiment, we measured and report the mean error rate of all peers.
6.1.1 Measuring error rates
The experiments in this section are intended to show the error rates that results from differ-
entially private model aggregation compared to locally trained models. This experiment
is concerned with our goal of validating previous work and how error rates differ in the
centralized and the distributed, differentially private setting.
Experiment Name Peers Data per peer 
Centralized logistic regression 1 3000 N/A
Disjoint logistic regression 10 300 N/A
Aggregated model 10 300 1.0
Ensemble model 10 300 1.0
Aggregated model 10 300 0.1
Ensemble model 10 300 0.1
Table 6.1: Measuring error rates
In each of the experiments in Table 6.1, we first chose an optimal regularization λ in
the range [2−8, 28] by cross validation. We then measured the classification error with the
chosen λ on the test set. In all experiments, the aggregation group size was set to be equal
to the number of peers, and A was set to be equal to . This means that there could be
produced at most one aggregated model, and it would be available to all the participants.
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TheCentralized logistic regression experiment was intended to establish the best achiev-
able performance with our implementation of logistic regression trained by SGD. It corre-
sponds to the traditional non-private and centralized training of classification models. Note
that the results of these experiments may not be state-of-the-art for each data set, since we
have not performed advanced feature extraction and selection. This is acceptable, since
the intention of these experiments was to establish a baseline that we can compare with
when producing models that are formed in a private and decentralized manner. We were
mainly interested in observable difference in performance metrics when we compared our
centralized solution and distributed, differentially private solution.
The Disjoint logistic regression experiment considers a situation where the participat-
ing peers have a subset of the data and locally train one model each. Each peer fits a model
and makes predictions independently.
The Aggregated model experiment lets the peers create an aggregate model using
Pathak et al. [2010] approach, and the peers use this model only when labeling data. This
means that the locally trained model is only used to produce the aggregate model and never
for classification.
In the Ensemble model experiment the peers also produce an aggregate model, but
when classifying data their local model and the aggregated model classify in an ensem-
ble. The Aggregated model and Ensemble model experiments were run twice, with two
different values of  which represent a significant difference in privacy level.
6.1.2 Confirming expected effects of differential privacy
In this project we have implemented training of a logistic regression, the aggregation
mechanism guaranteeing differential privacy and the communication scheme that forms
groups of peers to create aggregate models. When tuning the parameters of the implemen-
tation, we expected certain changes in the measured performance based on the theoretical
and experimental results of previous work. The experiments in this section are intended to
be validation of both previous work and of our implementation. In particular, we expected
certain effects when changing the privacy parameter  and the regularization parameter λ.
By confirming the expected behavior, we could increase confidence in the correctness of
our implementation, while also visualizing the dynamics of differential privacy.
Changes in 
The variance of the noise added when producing aggregated models increases with the
parameter . To confirm this behavior, we ran experiments with all parameters fixed except
for . Each peer was given 368 data records. The regularization level was chosen based on
the results in Section 6.1.1.
Experiment Name Peers Group size λ 
Spam, effect of  10 10 2−2 [2−8, 28]
Table 6.2: Effects of privacy level. Adult.
All the peers in this experiment collaborate to produce one aggregated model, and the
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full privacy budget is expended in the single aggregation. When the peers are tasked to
label the test data, they use their local model and the aggregated model in an ensemble.
Changes in λ
As stated by Equation 3.12, increasing the regularization parameter λ will decrease the
variance of noise added when aggregating. For this reason we expected that higher values
of regularization should help counter the perturbing effect of lower values of . How-
ever, as the regularization value grows, the predictive performance should degrade as the
models become unable to fit to the data. To confirm these effects, we tested wide ranges
of regularization strength with different levels of privacy. Each peer was given 368 data
records.
Experiment Name Peers Group size λ 
Spam, observing λ, no privacy 10 10 [2−8, 23] 210
Spam, observing λ, common privacy 10 10 [2−8, 23] 0.1
Spam, observing λ, stronger privacy 10 10 [2−8, 23] 0.01
Table 6.3: Effect of regularization strength
The values of  for the common privacy level in Table 6.3 is chosen based on Dwork
[2008], which suggests that 0.1 is a common value.
6.1.3 Changes in data availability
As we are testing in a decentralized setting were data quantities might be low, we wanted
to compare how the local, the aggregated models, and both of them in an ensemble respond
to changes in data availability. The experiment seen in Table 6.4 is concerned with explor-
ing the way data availability affects error rate in the distributed setting. Since all other
parameters except for the amount of data per peer is fixed, the overall quantity of data in
the system changes for each parameter combination in this experiment. The regularization
level was chosen based on the results in Section 6.1.1.
Experiment Name Peers Data per peer λ Type
Spambase, data availability, disjoint 10 10− 360 2−2 Local
Spambase, data availability, aggregated 10 10− 360 2−2 Aggregated
Spambase, data availability, ensemble 10 10− 360 2−2 Ensemble
Table 6.4: Effect of data availability
6.1.4 Changes in number of participants
The experiment shown in Table 6.5 is an attempt to partially answer to our research ques-
tion about the possible loss of accuracy in our distributed setting from the participation
perspective. As we expected the error rate might be affected by the number of partici-
pating peers, we designed this experiment to give an idea of how peer prediction quality
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changes when more peers are present. Except for the number of peers, all parameters were
kept fixed, including the amount of data per peer. This means that as the number of peers
increase, there is more data available in the system. The regularization level was chosen
based on the results in Section 6.1.1.
Experiment Name Peers Group size Data per peer λ 
Adult, increasing participants 5− 50 5 500 22 1.0
Table 6.5: Effect of number of peers
6.1.5 Peer error rate variance
With this experiment we wanted to explore the variance in the quality of models held by
each peer, and see how it changes when aggregate models are introduced. In order to
increase the chances that we can observe variance among peers, the amount of data owned
by each peer is set at a low level of 250. The regularization level was chosen based on the
results in Section 6.1.1.
This experiment was concerned with reduction of peer error rate variance and to some
extent validation of previous work. Concerning the latter, we hoped to show whether or
not there was benefit in differentially private model aggregation compared to each peer
using a local model. Concerning the former, we wished to see if publishing aggregated
models and using them in ensembles to make predictions could help reduce peer error rate
variance.
Experiment Name Peers Data λ  Type
Adult, peer variance, only local 10 250 22 1.0 Local
Adult, peer variance, aggregated 10 250 22 1.0 Aggregated
Adult, peer variance, ensemble of both 10 250 22 1.0 Ensemble
Table 6.6: Observing peer error rate variance
6.1.6 Effect of aggregation group size and model propagation
We believed that the number of peers participating in creating aggregated models could
affect the quality of the produced models. In the experiment seen in Table 6.7 we have
a fixed number of peers and a fairly high level of . This is because we want to observe
the value of aggregating models, which should be more apparent in a situation with lower
perturbation. Since participation in a single model aggregation fully expends the privacy
budget of a peer and the number of peers is fixed, a higher number of aggregate models
are produced when the group size is smaller. Smaller groups result in each peer having a
larger ensemble with each model being based on less data. Larger groups result in each
peer having a smaller ensemble with each model being based on more data.
This experiment relates to two of our research questions - reduction of accuracy loss
and peer accuracy variance in our distributed, differentially private setting. We hoped to
identify group configurations that minimized both of these performance metrics.
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We run this experiment with two different approaches for publishing the aggregated
models, as discussed in Section 5.6.1. The regularization level was chosen based on the
results in Section 6.1.1.
Experiment Name Peers Group size  λ Publication
Changing group sizes 30 [1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30] 1.0 22 Party
Changing group sizes 30 [1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30] 1.0 22 All
Table 6.7: Effect of aggregation group size
6.1.7 Value of budgeting privacy
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, it is possible to spread the usage of the privacy guaran-
tee in a budgeted fashion. Table 6.8 shows the experiment where we wanted to explore
the potential benefit of performing repeated aggregations, at the cost of lower  in each
aggregation.
This relates to our first research question, with considers loss in accuracy, in two ways.
Firstly, creating ten aggregated models by spreading the budget and then using them in an
ensemble might on its own have interesting effects on quality of predictions. Secondly, it
might be necessary for peers in a distributed setting to participate in aggregations several
times. This is especially true if aggregated models cannot be shared globally for privacy
or practical reasons.
The regularization level was chosen based on the results in Section 6.1.1.
Experiment Name Peers  A λ
Budgeting privacy 10 0.1 [ 0.116 , 0.1] 2
2
Table 6.8: Effect of budgeting privacy
6.2 Results
This section provides the results of the experiments listed in Section 6.1, which are ana-
lyzed further in Chapter 7.
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6.2.1 Measuring error rate
Experiment Name Mean error Std. dev. λ
Centralized logistic regression 0.162 0.0020 23
Disjoint logistic regression 0.172 0.0014 22
Aggregated model,  = 1.0 0.154 0.0015 2−1
Ensemble model,  = 1.0 0.162 0.0013 21
Aggregated model,  = 0.1 0.160 0.0030 20
Ensemble model,  = 0.1 0.164 0.0013 22
Table 6.9: Measuring error rate: Adult
Experiment Name Mean error Std. dev. λ
Centralized logistic regression 0.104 0.0059 2−8
Disjoint logistic regression 0.159 0.0026 2−5
Aggregated model,  = 1.0 0.163 0.0103 2−3
Ensemble model,  = 1.0 0.150 0.0045 2−5
Aggregated model,  = 0.1 0.182 0.0256 2−1
Ensemble model,  = 0.1 0.157 0.0117 2−2
Table 6.10: Measuring error rate: Spambase
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6.2.2 Confirming expected effects of differential privacy
Changes in 
Figure 6.1: Effect of privacy level (Spambase)
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Changes in λ
Figure 6.2: Effect of regularization, no privacy (Spambase)
Figure 6.3: Effect of regularization, common privacy (Spambase)
Figure 6.4: Effect of regularization, high privacy (Spambase)
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6.2.3 Changes in data availability
Figure 6.5: Spambase, data availability, disjoint
Figure 6.6: Spambase, data availability, aggregated
Figure 6.7: Spambase, data availability, ensemble
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6.2.4 Changes in number of participants
Figure 6.8: Effect of peer numbers. Adult.
6.2.5 Peer error rate variance
Model Mean error Peer std. dev.
Local, no privacy 0,175 0.006
Aggregated, d. privacy 0,158 0.000
Ensemble with both 0.166 0.002
Table 6.11: Variance among peers. Adult.
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6.2.6 Effect of aggregation group size and model propagation
Group
size
Mean
error
Error
std. dev.
Peer error
std. dev.
1 0.174 0.0048 0.0068
5 0.168 0.0061 0.0054
10 0.171 0.0064 0.0078
15 0.172 0.0048 0.0071
20 0.170 0.0052 0.0057
25 0.168 0.0051 0.0052
30 0.168 0.0040 0.0031
Table 6.12: Effect of aggregation group size. Party-publishing. Adult.
Group
size
Mean
error
Error
std. dev.
Peer error
std. dev.
1 0.168 0.0009 0.0003
5 0.165 0.0013 0.0007
10 0.165 0.0012 0.0008
15 0.165 0.0008 0.0026
20 0.165 0.0005 0.0026
25 0.165 0.0007 0.0027
30 0.165 0.0006 0.0027
Table 6.13: Effect of aggregation group size. All-publishing. Adult.
6.2.7 Value of budgeting privacy
Figure 6.9: Effect of Privacy Budgeting. (Adult)
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Analysis
In this chapter we will give our analysis of the experimental results seen in Section 6.2.
7.1 Comparing Measured Error Rate
Experiment and author Error Rate
Optimal Logistic regression [Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil, 2006] 0.114
Multiparty DP LogReg [Pathak et al., 2010] 0.24
Table 7.1: Table with baseline results from the Adult Dataset
Experiment and author Error Rate
LOGICBOOST[Sharma and Arora, 2013] 0.1024
LogReg-TRIRLS[Kumar et al., 2012] 0.1389
Table 7.2: Table with baseline results from the Spambase Dataset
These two tables form the baseline for the analysis of our classification framework. In
Table 7.2 we have included the results of two classifiers reported in the literature [Sharma
and Arora, 2013; Kumar et al., 2012] for the Spambase data set. These are both centralized
approaches to logistic regression, where both had as a research goal of trying to find an
ideal classifier for spam detection. In similar fashion, we provide two baseline classifi-
cation results in Table 7.1 for the Adult data set. Here we chose to provide baselines for
two approaches, where the first [Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil, 2006] is an optimal result
using logistic regression in a centralized manner. The second entry is the result of the
differentially private system of Pathak et al. [2010], on which we’ve stated that we wish to
improve in RQ3.
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7.1.1 Adult data set
We first consider our error rate measurements on the Adult data set, seen in Table 6.9. We
measured a mean error rate of 0.162 for Centralized logistic regression. This is not as good
as the baseline result of 0.114 reported by [Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil, 2006], but still
is well below the positive class rate of 0.24. In the Disjoint logistic regression experiment,
where each peer has a smaller subset of the data and disjointly train models and classify
data, we measured an error rate of 0.172. This is expected, since there is significiantly less
data available to fit the models.
For Aggregated model,  = 1.0, we measured an error rate of 0.154, which is lower
than our centralized result. This is very interesting, as it indicates that an aggregated model
formed from models trained on data subsets of size 300 can yield lower error rates than
a model trained in a centralized model on a data set of 3000. This same behavior was
observed for the Susy data set, which is listed in the Appendix. It is not clear if this
is a common occurence or if it is only applicable to these particular data sets. It is not
observed for the Spambase data set, where the error rate jumps from 0.104 to 0.163 when
comparing the centralized and the distributed, aggregation setting. A possible explanation
for why we don’t see the positive effect for the Spambase data set might be the scale of
the regularization used. For Susy and Adult, the optimal λ was found to be 2−2 and 2−1
respectively, while it was 2−3 for Spambase. A lower λ increases variance of noise, so
the aggregated models are more perturbed for Spambase, even though  is the same for
all data sets. Lastly, it is notable that the error rate on the Adult data set increased only
slightly from 0.154 to 0.160 for the aggregated model when  changed from 1.0 to 0.1.
This indicates that a strong privacy guarantee is feasible.
For Ensemble model,  = 1.0 error rate increases slightly to 0.162, which is slightly
worse than Aggregate model, but still not worse than the centralized model. For this par-
ticular data set, it is not clear whether it is worthwhile to include the locally trained model
in an ensemble when classifying.
We should point out that Pathak et al. [2010] report the error rate of their optimal,
centralized solution applied to the Adult set as 0.24. This is strange, since it is very close
to the class distribution of the Adult data set. While they show that their differentially
private solution approaches their centralized solution, they give no compelling reason to
believe that the error rate of 0.24 is a non-trivial performance. A very similar error rate
could be achieved by only predicting the negative class.
7.1.2 Spambase data set
We next consider the error rate measurements on the Spambase data set, seen in Table
6.10. We measured a mean error rate of 0.104 for Centralized logistic regression, which is
very close to the results of [Sharma and Arora, 2013] at 0.1024.
Contrary to the results seen for the Adult data set, neither the Aggregated model or
the Ensemble model is able to achieve error rates comparable to the Centralized logis-
tic regression test. As discussed in the previous section, this might be due to the lower
regularization required for the Spambase data set.
While the positive effects of aggregation is not seen for the Spambase data set with the
configuration we have tested, it appears to support the Ensemble model approach. While
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the error rate is 0.163 for Aggregated model,  = 1.0, it is 0.150 for Ensemble model,
 = 1.0. The same pattern is seen with  = 0.1, where the error rate goes from 0.182 for
the Aggregate model setting to 0.157 for the Ensemble model setting. We also note that a
positive effect is also seen with Ensemble model for the Susy data set, when  = 0.1. It
appears that using the aggregated model and the locally trained model in an ensemble can
help reduce the error rate, but that this is not always the case.
7.1.3 Validating model quality
We have restricted our analysis to the error rates of our solution, though confusion matrices
and ROC-curves were produced for all experiments. The confusion matrices were used to
verify that the classifiers were discriminating between the two classes. While error rates
are presented as mean value among all peers, we give only the confusion matrix of a
single, randomly selected peer. The intention is that the error rates we report reflect the
model quality on average for all participants in the system, while the confusion matrices
are intended to support the claim that the reported error rates correspond to non-trivial
classifiers. Confusion matrices for the Spambase data set is included in the Appendix.
Actual
1 0
Predicted 1 2393 1146
0 1453 11289
Table 7.3: Confusion Matrix: Adult. Local model only.
Actual
1 0
Predicted 1 2245 888
0 1601 11547
Table 7.4: Confusion Matrix: Adult. Aggregated, DP model only.
Actual
1 0
Predicted 1 2102 895
0 1744 11540
Table 7.5: Confusion Matrix: Adult. Ensemble of Aggregated and Local.
An important point to discuss in this context is validation at the peer level. How would
a peer know if its local model or ensemble is good enough? We have validated with
cross validation and tested with a held out test set, but this luxury is not available in a
real setting. One option would be to design a scheme to perform cross validation at the
aggregation group level.
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Ideally, peers could cooperate to form a sort of test set when the system is live by send-
ing incoming data instances to each other. This would allow the system to respond more
quickly to changes in data distribution, as deterioration in prediction accuracy can be mea-
sured in a near-global fashion as soon as the changes occur. This approach is problematic,
since peers may want to keep all incoming data private. The other alternative would be
to have peers measure their performance on their respective incoming data only. If peers
have very different incoming data distributions, this would give a less biased estimate over
time, but building a good estimate could take much longer, depending on the data rate.
7.2 Importance of Epsilon
As explained in section 3.1, differential privacy works by disguising an individual’s data
in a data set by adding noise to their records. The amount of noise added is determined by
the privacy parameter , and grows exponentially the closer the parameter gets to zero.
Figure 6.1 shows the effect of the privacy parameter  in our experiment. We wanted
to test the effect of varying the -value in the range from 2−10 to 29, especially to find out
how the classifier would perform when faced with data with high amount of noise added
to it. The positive class rate in the UCI Spambase data set is 0.4, so any error rate at this
level is no better than a random classifier. The plot shows how sensitive output is to the
values of .
Our experiments indicate that an ideal range for the -value seems to be between 0.1
and 1.0 for all datasets. If the value falls below this range, both the error rate and the error
variance quickly grows and the classifier becomes unusable. Some of the earlier research
by Dwork [2008] theorized that 0.01 might be suitable in analysis with a need for an extra
strong privacy guarantee. In our case that is not a feasible limit, as the error rate at this
privacy level is growing towards the class distribution. Other research performed in the
literature Pathak et al. [2010]; Kellaris and Papadopoulos [2013]; Hsu et al. [2014] seem
to agree that 0.1 is a natural lower limit.
Looking at Table 6.9, we see that the difference between the our optimal result from
Adult at 0.157 with =1.0 and the high privacy result of 0.163 with =0.1, is not particularly
big. The results of running a big range of epsilon over the Spambase dataset (Figure 6.1),
also indicate that there is not much improvement in increasing the  beyond 1.0. This is
interesting, as it suggest there might exist a natural bound on the trade-off between privacy
and utility. If a theorem could prove this bound of where there will be no further increase
in utility by decreasing the privacy, this would serve as a big breakthrough for the field of
differential privacy. To the best of our knowledge however, no such theorem has yet been
found. Lee and Clifton [2011] have tried providing such a bound, but their proof is limited
to a very specific scenario on a unreasonably simple example database. Nevertheless, their
effort suggest that future research might bring more conclusive proof. In our case, we can
only report what we have discovered after performing carefully monitored experiments.
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7.3 The Importance of Data
As can be told from Figure 6.5, 6.7 and 6.5, the amount of data available for each peer is
important. The more data a peer have, the greater the chance is that it will make a decent
local classifier.
Figure 6.7 and 6.6 indicate how the classification performance improves as the amount
of data records available to each peer grows. When each peer only have a small amount of
data to create their local classifier, the classifier tends to have display terrible performance.
As peers gain more data, both the performance and the variance of the classifier improves.
The reason for this improvement is two-fold. 1: A bigger sample size for the logistic
regression model generally leads to better performance Peduzzi et al. [1996]. 2: The
sensitivity of logistic regression (see equation 3.10) is bounded by the size of the training
set. What this means is that the more data a peer have available, the less amount of noise
is needed to obfuscate their logistic model.
The observation we’ve made is therefore thoroughly grounded in theory, and is impor-
tant to highlight when discussing our main research question. Until a certain amount of
data has been gathered, a system based on our distributed architecture will display very
poor performance. What is interesting however, is that the amount of data needed seems
to be a relatively low number. In the paper written by Pathak et al. [2010], they report that
each party was given at least 3256 data records. In our experiments we found that a much
smaller amount of data could still result in decent classifiers.
7.4 Importance of Regularization
7.4.1 Regularization in a low privacy setting
Figure 6.2 shows the normal effect regularization has on accuracy for the Spambase data
set, by setting  so high that noise is essentially nonexistent. As the regularization parame-
ter λ grows large, the model becomes less able to fit the training data, eventually resulting
in models predicting only the negative class, which constitutes 60% of the data set. This
happens because the high regularization forces the parameter vector to the zero vector,
resulting in uniform class probability for all samples.
On this particular data set it appears that a logistic regression model has low risk of
overfitting, since the cross-validated error does not increase when the level of regular-
ization is very low. Ignoring the effects of privacy mechanisms, this would mean that
selecting some regularization parameter in the lower half of the range should offer reason-
able performance. Choosing a level at the high end of this range could still be preferable,
motivated by a desire to attain a model that is highly generalizable.
7.4.2 Regularization in a high privacy setting
When noise with significant variance is added to the model creation process, tuning λ will
adjust noise variance as well. Equation 3.12 states that the noise variance is inversely
proportional to λ. The choice of regularization then must balance the model flexibility at
lower levels of λ with the decreased noise at higher levels of lambda. When epsilon is
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reduced, and therefore noise variance increased, the choice of regression becomes more
clearly restricted than in the noise-free situation. Based on figure Figure 6.1, we picked
 = 0.1 to attempt to visualize this effect. At this level of privacy we see a clear decrease
in performance, while the models still are making better than random predictions. Figure
6.3 shows mean error rate when  is set to this level of privacy. The effect of noise is now
clearly visible far into the range of regularization, only returning to comparable error rate
when λ = 2−2.
A further decrease in  should shift the optimal regularization level even higher, even-
tually meeting with the point. This situation is shown in Figure 6.4, where the experiment
moves into lower variance just as regularization is getting too high to support good model
fit. The result is that there is no good value for λ. A situation like this could be reme-
died by either decreasing the level of privacy, or increasing the minimum amount of data
available at the peers, both of which would decrease noise variance as given by Equation
3.12. This could be something to keep in mind if putting a differential privacy method into
practice, whenever the sensitivity depends on data set size - postponing model training to
a later date when more data is available can be beneficial for both model generalization
and minimizing the impact of privacy.
7.4.3 Thoughts and guidelines on regularization
The fact that regularization level affects the noise variance has another interesting conse-
quence when tackling more than one data set. Typically, different data sets tolerate varying
levels of regularization. For the Spambase data set, Figure 6.2 indicates that λ should be
at most 2−2 or 2−3, while the Appendix figures for the Adult data set with same per-peer
record count show near optimal regularization values as high as 22. Such a significant
difference in regularization can make or break a model, due to the effect it has on the noise
variance.
The method we are testing have a couple of notable aspects concerning selection of
regularization strength. Firstly, it is necessary to take care to validate models in a way that
takes into account the increased variance in trained models due to noise.
Secondly, the fact that regularization has such a significant effect on the noise variance
means that truly knowing the error rate of the final model would require aggregation and
noise addition. Indeed, this issue arises in both the original approach by Pathak et al.
[2010] and our method. Since noise is not added until the aggregate models are produced,
a realistic measurement of performance can’t be performed until after the aggregation
step. This means that either the privacy budget would be expended in the first iteration of
cross validation, or the noise level for each aggregation would have to be reduced. In our
experiment we have determined good values of λ by performing grid searches over ranges
of values, but doing a grid search in a decentralized setting while maintaining privacy
guarantees is non-trivial. It would be necessary to create a new protocol which includes
some method of λ selection.
We believe the most practical way to do this would be by letting each peer choose
the strongest possible regularization that is within some bounded distance from the op-
timal value found in cross-validation on their local data. The protocol by Pathak et al.
[2010] briefly described in Section 3.2.3 also includes a step to secretly communicate the
minimum data set size among all the participants. The peers could additionally communi-
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cate their chosen λ and the curator could then use the minimal regularization level when
choosing the level of noise to add.
7.5 Analysis of Peer Participation Effects
The previous paragraphs considered effects of noise variance on the ability of peers to
make predictions. In this section we consider another important aspect that determines the
quality of aggregated models - the number of peers that participate to create them.
Figure 6.8 shows what happens when the aggregation group size stays fixed, but differ-
ent numbers of peers are available. A higher number of peers mean that more models can
be created. In this experiment the aggregation group size was five, which means that just
one aggregated model was produced at the low end of the range, while 10 models were
produced at the high end. If there is any utility of aggregating models, it is not visible in
the mean error rate for the Adult data set with this amount of records. We suspected that an
effect would be stronger when the peers have less data, since aggregation should allow the
peers to benefit from each other data. We tested with different amounts of available data
as low as 75 instances per peer, but we made the same observations in these experiments.
The charts showing other levels of data availability are included in the Appendix.
One possible explanation for the small changes in error rate might be the uniformity
of data distribution. In our current experimental setup, the data is partitioned randomly
between the peers, which means that the peers will have same number of samples from
the same data distribution. In reality, users might have very different numbers of samples
with different distributions. This is discussed further in Section 9.6 on Future Work. On
the other hand, these experiments don’t show any negative effects of predicting with an
ensemble of aggregated models. While we expect that there are situations where ensemble
prediction could be detrimental, such issues could be mitigated by actively removing less
useful models from the ensemble as it grows.
7.6 Analysis of Model Variance
While it is an important goal to minimize error rates, the variance in performance across
peers might be just as important. It could be better that all participants achieve sufficient
predictive performance rather than having some peers with fantastic performance while
others make useless predictions.
We see from the results in Figure 6.11 that variance is smaller when the aggregated
models are used, but the difference is not very big, as the variance is small in both cases.
We believe the weakness of the effect might be for the same reason as the small amount
of change in error rate seen in Section 7.5. The data is distributed uniformly to the peers,
which means that they will get fairly similar models as long as they have sample data to
get close to what a model trained on the full data set would look like. Given a data set
partitioned into less uniform subsets, the model variance might increase and the beneficial
effect of aggregations could become more apparent. However, this would require first
attaining and preprocessing a suitable dataset. It would also require additional changes
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such as implementing minimum data set sizes for participation, to avoid excessive noise
being added in aggregation. Due to limited time, this is left for future work.
7.7 Analysis of Aggregation Groups Size and Model Prop-
agation
The results of this experiment are seen in Table 6.12 and 6.13. In these experiments we
measured how the mean error rate changes as the size of the aggregation groups vary. We
ran two such experiments, one where aggregated models were shared globally with all
peers and one where they were shared only with the party that participated in producing
each model. Each peer will include in its ensemble any model shared with it.
Firstly, note that an aggregation group size of one corresponds to each peer simply
fitting a model and publishing it with noise added. It seems that there is at least some
benefit of producing aggregates, as a group size of one has the highest error rate. There
also appears to be some positive trend for higher group sizes in the Party-publising case.
Unfortunately, since the different is quite small, a certain conclusion cannot be drawn for
this particular data set.
While the difference in error rates is too small to be significant between the two ap-
proaches of publishing models, there is a significant effect on the standard deviation of
the error between iterations of the experiment. Though the scale of standard deviation is
very small for both cases, this indicates that globally sharing models might be preferable.
Repeating these experiments on data sets less uniformly distributed among peers could
increase scale of the variance, increasing the importance of sharing models globally. Of
course, globally publishing all models might not be feasible for practical reasons or accept-
able for privacy reasons. Instead, spreading the aggregated models as widely as possible
might achieve a similar effect.
Next, we consider the standard deviation, or error variance, measured among the
peers. This metric indicates how consistently the network achieves good predictive mod-
els. Firstly, we note that publishing to all peers yielded much lower standard deviation for
most group sizes. Again, the scale of variance is fairly small, but we believe this effect
could be much more considerable with other data sets, especially if data is not uniformly
distributed. Interestingly, the variance in peer error rate is smallest when aggregation group
sizes is small. This means it might be necessary to make a trade-off between mean error
rate and variance between peers.
This effect might be caused by the fact that the peers include their locally fitted models
in their ensemble when classifying data. As seen from the results in Section 6.2.5, the
variance in error rate among peers is zero for aggregated models. This is as expected,
since all peers share the exact same set of models. The local models on the other hand
result only from the local data of each peer. Since all models in the ensembles are weighted
equally, the effect of the local model decreases as a higher number of aggregate models are
published. If this is the case of lower peer error rate variance at lower group sizes, a similar
decrease in variance might be achieved by decreasing the weight of the local model. On
the other hand, this might be detrimental for those peers that succeeded in training high
quality models. In an online learning setting, models weights could be learned over time
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as new labeled data arrives.
7.8 Analysis of Privacy Budgeting
Next we consider the results of the privacy budgeting experiment, seen in Figure 6.9. For
lower values of per aggregation A, more aggregated models are produced, but they are
more perturbed. For most levels of A, including the maximum level of 0.1, the error rate
remained fairly fixed just below 0.2. Once the lowest values of A is reached, at 16 and

32
the error rate rises sharply.
Firstly, we note that there appears to be no improvement in the error rate when ag-
gregating multiple, more perturbed models and using them in an ensemble. Furthermore,
when A is too low, the error rate increases. This indicates that it might make more sense
to fully expend the privacy budget on a single aggregation, in a setting where the aggre-
gated model can be shared globally. This maximizes the chance that the aggregated model
is not too perturbed to be a good fit to data, while there is nothing to lose from only being
able to produce a single model.
In a setting where models cannot be shared globally, either for practical or privacy
reasons, the results are perhaps even more interesting. Since the error rate stays approxi-
mately the same in the range [ 8 , ], it is possible to choose a lower A and allow each peer
to take part in A model aggregations. The error rate could be very similar, but it would
let the information held in each data partition to be spread to a wider set of peers.
The same effects can be observed in the budgeting experiment on the Spambase data
set, though the error rate increases at much higher values of A, likely due to the lower
regularization required for Spambase.
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Chapter 8
Toward a Real-World Application
Due to the relative novelty of differential privacy as a concept, we’ve found the research
and discussion of the real-world applicability of a DP-based system lacking in content.
We therefore want to contribute to this field by adding some of our own experiences and
thoughts. This chapter will therefore discuss the potential applications of a system based
on our distributed machine learner, and some of the prerequisite criteria we’ve found to
need fulfillment before designing an application in the first place.
8.1 Criteria for an Application
What we’ve discovered during our pre-studies and experimentation have resulted in the
following suitability criteria for a potential application.
1. The interest in privacy is strong, and the risk of re-identification is significant.
2. The information to be analyzed must be stored in some form of a structured database.
3. The amount of data must be significant.
4. The analysis of the data can tolerate some distortion in the information from the
database.
5. The analysis of the data do not involve study of outliers, or other individuals.
These criteria are not meant to provide an all-compassing set of rules that when followed
will mean instant success for a given application, but rather as a definition of characteristics
that can lead to good application opportunities if considered.
8.1.1 Strong privacy interest
As a first criterion, a solid interest in privacy is necessary due to implementation of a dif-
ferential privacy mechanism will lead to a trade-off between utility and privacy. As we’ve
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have shown in our analysis the effects of this trade-off can be minimized, but stronger
privacy guarantees will inevitably lead to decaying accuracy due to the noise addition.
The underlying assumption in this criterion is therefore that the risk of re-identification is
significant, but manageable to secure by applying a differential privacy mechanism. The
potential for future re-identification should be a factor in determining the strength of the
privacy risk, but it should not prevent consideration of other factors, such as the potential
public utility one can gain from data analysis.
8.1.2 Structured data
The mechanisms that were originally designed to support differential privacy were created
to address the threats to privacy from the sharing of information contained in a centralized
database. We’ve shown through our experimentation that there are an potential applica-
bility in designing a distributed machine learning system, but there are still a criterion
that the data must be structured and labeled before any form for learning can be applied.
Future experimentation can potentially prove that this criterion can be relaxed. This can
then open avenues for exploring the usage of other branches of machine learning, such as
deep learning and unsupervised learning. For the moment however, structured data is an
important prerequisite.
8.1.3 Data size
As we showed in Section 7.3, the amount of data available for learning can have massive
impact on the accuracy of the resulting classifier. This is a direct result of equation 3.12,
which specifies the upper bound on the sensitivity for distributed logistic regression, i.e
the noise needed to hide a record in the data set. Since a higher value of nj , i.e a larger
amount of data in the smallest data set, will lead to a smaller amount of noise added to
each aggregated model and generally better accuracy. The exact amount of data needed
to create a decent classifier is difficult to exactly quantify, but our results indicate that a
smaller number of records than that initially tested by Pathak et al. [2010] is truly needed
to construct a decent classifier. . The value of the privacy parameter  will also play a
factor in the amount of data needed, as a stronger guarantee of privacy requires a larger
amount of data (see Figure 6.1).
Any application that bases itself on our distributed framework will therefore need a
sizable amount of data available in each peer to create the initial models. This can pose a
problem if the application is released without any form of pre-performed training, as the
users will not gain any value from the application before the necessary amount of data is
available, and therefore they likely will be less inclined to provide the data needed. This
problem can be compared to the classical cold start problem prevalent in recommender
systems. In a typical collaborative filtering setting the system will match a user’s rating
against other users’ and find the people with the highest similarity score. The cold start
problem appear when recommendations are required for items that no user has yet rated
[Schein et al., 2002], which often is the case in newly designed systems without the nec-
essary user mass.
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8.1.4 Tolerance for data distortion
The fourth criterion is that the usage of the data analysis must tolerate some distortion.
Since our mechanism for supporting differential privacy function by inserting Laplacian
noise, the resulting classifier will be a distorted version of the ”true” classifier. The users
of a system based on our framework must therefore be willing to accept a potential loss of
utility due to distortion in return for a privacy guarantee for their data.
Certain studies of large data sets might not be able to accommodate even small drop
in accuracy in their system. Examples of this would be studies of health care data from
hospitals or precise scientific research, where just a small source of error might render the
results inoperable. Another example is the study of census data, where a researcher noted
that the introduction of noise often resulted in demographic research errors [Yakowitz,
2011].
This is not to say that research on health data or census data is completely infeasible,
as both our own research on the Adult data set (US Census data) and the research of Ji
et al. [2014a] on health data has shown promising results. What it means is that certain
considerations need to be taken when performing these studies, such as simplifying the
problem, finding workarounds for dealing with wider margin of errors, and more.
8.1.5 Study type
The fifth criterion for adopting differential privacy is that it precludes the study of outliers.
The goal of such a study is inconsistent with the differential privacy goal of preventing the
identification of the presence or absence of a record in a database. An application based
on our architecture should therefore instead focus on finding similarities between users,
and how to best leverage the aggregation mechanism we employ.
8.2 Potential Future Applications
8.2.1 Wearable health sensor data analysis
A growing worldwide market is the sale and usage of wearable sensors, such as environ-
mental sensors, motion sensors, and health sensors. A IHS report [Nissil et al., 2014] from
2014 estimates that the market for sensors in wearables will expand to 135 million units
in 2019, up from 50 million in 2013. These wearables will evolve from being just a single
purpose device such as a pedometer and grow into more multipurpose devices such as a
smartwatch, which will consist of several sensors which can monitor varying areas of use.
The wearable devices are implementing fitness and health monitoring by using a mix-
ture of sensors, such as motion, pulse, hydration and skin temperature sensors. All of
these wearables will therefore generate a massive amount of data about the person who
are using them. This data can be considered as highly sensitive information, as it can
unveil a lot about their user’s health, and the manufacturers of these devices knows this.
Dana Liebelson, a reporter for Huffington Post, queried several US-based fitness device
companies about their privacy. One of the replies she got, was that ”the company does not
sell information collected from the device that can identify individual users”, but that they
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were considering marketing aggregate information that cannot be linked back to an indi-
vidual[Liebelson, 2014]. As we saw in section 2.2 and 2.3, many of the popular methods
for aggregating and anonymizing a data set carries an inherent risk of a privacy breach.
A study [Raij et al., 2011] have been performed to try to measure the privacy concerns
of people using wearable sensors, and found that activity trackers that monitor heart rate,
steps, and pulse for instance, was usually seen as inoffensive to the users privacy at the
start of the study. The researchers then had some of the testers wear sensors, and could
from the resulting data infer periods of heightened stress, as well as derive certain context
and behaviors that could trigger the aforementioned stress. The participants were then
given a similar questionnaire to the initial one, and many then reported a heightened sense
of concern.
This is where we see a potential application for our distributed framework. Although
there would be some initial problems due to our learner at the moment requiring labeled
data to create a classifier, there can be potential in a health application where users keep
control of their own data. According to IBM research, areas in which enhanced data and
analytics yield the greatest results include: pinpointing patients who are the greatest con-
sumers of health resources or at the greatest risk for adverse outcomes; providing these in-
dividuals with the information they need to make informed decisions and more effectively
manage their own health as well as more easily adopt and track healthier behaviors[IBM,
2013]. While pinpointing a single user might not be feasible due to the differential privacy
guarantee, there could be merit in an application where the user could be anonymously
classified if he or she have a potential health risk such as diabetes. This classification
would be based on the model created by their local data. The user could then be sent in-
formation on how to handle their health more efficiently, and potentially also be given an
exercise regime that could be monitored through their wearables.
Evaluating this application against the suitability criteria we suggested in Section 8.1,
we can see that a health application would have little trouble fulfilling the first three crite-
ria. While the public attitude towards their privacy can vary from the completely uncon-
cerned to a small proportion of the public that has strong views on privacy, research would
suggest that people have increasing expectations on security and choice about access to
their records [Singleton et al., 2008]. The two next criteria that deal with data structure
and size should be relatively easy to fulfill, as a wearable health sensor would quickly
register a plethora of data records for use in analysis. Looking at the estimates for market
expansion there is definitely potential to gain a critical user mass due to the increasing
interest in such devices.
The two next criteria will most likely prove a bigger challenge to overcome, as earlier
research on privacy-preserving health data analysis have found that a high-dimensional
data generally makes the usage of differential privacy inappropriate due to degrading util-
ity [Gardner et al., 2013; Mohammed et al., 2013]. One would therefore need to be careful
when deciding the goal of study, and start out with a well-thought out plan of data collec-
tion, analysis, and visualization.
8.2.2 Private sharing of business data
A potentially interesting and lucrative market can be found in facilitating the sharing of
data between businesses in a private manner. Our motivating example is found in the busi-
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ness of oil market analysis, where competing firms gather a lot of data about oil price, rig
placements, supply ship availability, and more. They use this data to create analytical mod-
els which help them in their work, and they also sell this information to external clients.
Often the firms would like to collaborate their models or their data with their competitors.
This could for example be done to validate that they are seeing the same market trends,
but due to the sensitive nature of their data and their fear of losing a competitive edge, they
cannot do this in a practical way.
It is in a situation like this that our distributed learner could be applied, and allow the
sharing of data between competitors as our system could provide a privacy guarantee to
all of the participants. The participants would never lose control of their data, as all they
would need to install a program that allows them to connect as a peer in our network: No
third party would ever need access to their data. Since the goal of the application is to
privately collaborate and find common trends in data from different parties, this would fit
perfectly in with the 4th and 5th suitability criteria.
The challenge would come mainly from trying to employ a common data structure, as
competing firms will most likely have their own way of handling the data they collect. An
application would need to be built with this in mind, as data would need either a common
format or a good amount of pre-processing. The latter could be solved by providing an
add-on feature to the application that would allow the businesses to easily pre-process the
data on their own schedule before making them available for analysis.
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Chapter 9
Reflections and Conclusion
9.1 Reflection on Implementation Challenges and Solu-
tion
While JADE was useful in offering an intuitive abstraction for modeling peers, it was
challenging to use dynamically. In particular, resetting experiments proved difficult. Since
creating a JADE environment creates a new process which also opens a particular TCP
port. If a JADE environment was created using the same port, the new instance would fail
to start up. Since creation and tear-down of the JADE platform is not instantaneous, it was
necessary. We also had issues with re-registering new instances of some of the agents we
used, since the unregistering is an asynchronous call. All in all, it might have been simpler
and less error prone to create a multi-threaded application using a tool that required less
investment, like OpenMP. On the other hand, such an implementation would not lend itself
as easily to a production prototype - our JADE implementation could with some extensions
be tested on in a setting with many devices.
9.2 Reflections on Privacy and Utility
Although the promise of differential privacy (see Section 3.1) seems to be an ideal guar-
antee for each of the data subjects in a data set, it has received mixed reviews from legal
scholars and computer scientist on its usefulness for resolving the privacy-utility trade-
off. Narayanan and Shmatikov praised differential privacy as ”a major step in the right
direction[Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2010]”. Sarathy and Muralidhar on the other hand,
contend that differentially private mechanisms are impracticable in computationally in-
tensive context, as well offering either very little privacy or very little utility[Sarathy and
Muralidhar, 2011]. Xiao et al. also criticized that the mechanisms often placed undue
burdens on data researchers due to decreased utility, especially with large data sets used
in research on populations[Xiao et al., 2011]. UCLA law professor Paul Ohm presented a
legal review of current anonymization techniques, including differential privacy, and prac-
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tically dismissed it as a solution from a legal standpoint. His critique was based on several
factors; Such as the mechanism not being very intuitive, having limited usefulness in high
noise situations, and potentially bug-prone security functions. He concluded that ”util-
ity and privacy are, at bottom, two goals at war with one another. In order to be useful,
anonymized data must be imperfectly anonymous[Ohm, 2010].”
All of the aforementioned critique of differential privacy can be considered valid crit-
icism in certain situations, as we have experienced the difficulty of balancing the utility-
privacy trade-off ourselves during our project. Our experiments have shown that there are
several parameters outside of just the privacy parameter  that need to be fine-tuned, such
as regularization, learning rate, and group size. Small changes in the composition of these
three can lead to wildly varying results for our classifier, but at least these parameters can
be tuned only with the intention of maximizing the utility of the resulting classifier. When
tuning the  parameter on the other hand, one always have to keep in mind the trade-off.
This tuning is made harder due to the exponential nature of the privacy guarantee, as well
as its not well-defined bounds. As Dwork herself has stated[Dwork, 2008]:
The choice of  is essentially a social question [...]That said, we tend to think
of  as, say, 0.01, 0.1, or in some cases, ln2 or ln3. If the probability that
some bad event will occur is very small, it might be tolerable to increase it
by such factors as 2 or 3, while if the probability is already felt to be close to
unacceptable,then an increase by a factor of e0.01 ≈ 1.01 might be tolerable,
while an increase of e, or even only e0.1, would be intolerable.
Our own experiments have indicated that the ideal range for  lies between 0.1 and
1.0, which fits reasonably well with Dwork’s description. At lower values than 0.1, the
error rate quickly rise as well as the error variance between the peers, meaning that an 
value of 0.01 returns too much noise to be of any utility. On the Spambase data set for
example, the error rate increased from 0.157 to 0.336 when  changed from 0.1 to 0.01. A
similar change from 1.0 to 0.1 however, only decreased the result by one percentage point,
meaning the error rate went from 0.157 to 0.150.
We will therefore conclude that although the trade-off between privacy and utility is by
no means solved by our current efforts, we have shown that it is not such a contradictory
problem as some people might claim. By performing careful pre-processing and exten-
sive parameter tuning, one can achieve useful results from classification even though the
models are obscured by differential privacy.
9.3 Reflection on the Practical Applicability of Differen-
tial Privacy
As we can tell from the previous section, differential privacy has been met with both
enthusiasm and criticism. In this section we will reflect on some of the strongest criticism
of differential privacy, such as what was presented in the paper by Sarathy and Muralidhar
[2011], as well as Ohm [2010]. Both of these papers try to discredit the applicability of
differential privacy by presenting mostly legal arguments, mainly targeting their criticism
on a single mechanism: the output perturbation. These authors seems to be assume that
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this is the only way of providing differential privacy, which would only be true if all the
literature on differential privacy consisted only of Dwork’s original paper from 2006.
In the paper by Sarathy and Muralidhar [2011], the opening example is of an internist
at a hospital, which query the database with differential privacy protection on the output.
They then claim: ”even knowing the distribution of noise that is randomly added to each
cell, the internist has no hope of interpreting the response. The true values could be almost
anything.” While this example is technically correct, it is flawed by the fact that no such
system would be allowed to exist in the first place, especially only with the basic output
perturbation mechanism.
As we pointed out in Chapter 8, a system need to consider certain criteria before de-
velopment, and design it accordingly. In a healthcare based information system, certain
considerations would certainly be necessary; One would definitely need a lax enough pri-
vacy guarantee that the output is not overtly perturbed, and the data would need to be
aggregated in a manner that would decrease the sensitivity as much as possible to require
the least amount of noise.
That is not to say that there are not valid criticism in Sarathy’s paper: differential
privacy can only make probabilistic guarantees, and if your legal standard is stricter than
that, it might not be the best choice. Their rhetoric on the other hand, with claims such
as: ”differential privacy is either not practicable or not novel” seems to be unfounded at
best when you consider their representation of differential privacy is basically a straw-
man argument. If legal scholars such as Sarathy and Ohm intends to level criticism from a
legal standpoint, it would be advisable to form an objective criticism after considering the
entirety of the research field, instead of selectively picking one aspect.
In their effort to discredit differential privacy, the authors have ignored both how aca-
demic and business research work to address these problems that they have raised. Re-
search are being still being performed on new differential privacy mechanisms with opti-
mal utility [Eigner et al., 2014], and there has also been research on creating an economic
model for choosing the epsilon value when designing a data study [Hsu et al., 2014]. On
the business side, Google have released a framework called RAPPOR, based on a concept
called randomized response [Erlingsson et al., 2014]. Additionally, a study by Chin and
Klinefelter [2012] infers that Facebook appears to be using differential privacy-supporting
technologies in its targeted advertising system without apparent loss of utility.
Based on these developments, as well as our own findings in this area, we find it safe to
conclude that differential privacy has great potential for real-world applicability. Despite
of all the critique and the difficulty it brings, we have still found it entirely rewarding to
perform research on the usage of differential privacy. As a solution, it is not an optimal fix-
all concept which can be applied to every form of machine learning problem and provide
privacy for the participants. There is still research to be done on how to make it work on
various forms of data, and also on how to make it in an online setting. All of these steps
will hopefully lead to a solution that can one day work in a way so that people will have
control of their own data, make it available for research and still be guaranteed that their
data and their privacy is safe.
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9.4 Conclusion and Final Remarks
RQ1: How big is the loss of accuracy in a distributed, differentially private system,
compared to a centrally trained model?
We have found that under ideal conditions and perfectly tuned parameters, the loss of accu-
racy can be minimized to a negligible difference compared to a centralized and noise-less
solution. We have however noted in our reflection that the research community have not
yet reached consensus on appropriate standards for the privacy parameter , but our results
indicate that a range between 0.1 and 1.0 seems to yield the best results. Further test-
ing and standardization by the community is ultimately needed before deciding in which
situations different values will be appropriate.
RQ2: How can the variance in accuracy between participants be minimized?
Since our tests involved uniform distributions of data among the participants, we observed
very low variance in accuracy even in the predictions of locally trained models. While it
is clear that variance will be zero if all peers use the same, aggregated models, the gain is
very small. Due to this, we have to conclude that in a setting with uniform data distribution
among participants, there is no compelling reason to use the aggregates if the goal is to
reduce variance. We believe that experiments in future work conducted with non-uniform
data distribution might lead to a different conclusion.
Note that we did in some cases see better error rate for the aggregated model than the
locals, so when considering both the error rate and its variance the aggregated model can
be the best choice despite the insignificant difference in variance.
RQ3: Can we validate and enhance earlier research in distributed differentially pri-
vate machine learning?
We have validated the research performed by Pathak et al. [2010] by using their proposed
solution as a baseline, and then extending it with some design of our own. We’ve ran sim-
ilar tests on the same dataset as they did, and found that our framework classified with a
mean error of 0.165 compared to their best case of 0.24. When we ran the experiment with
the same configuration as them, ergo without our upgrades, we achieved a mean error of
0.185. This indicates that they might have an non-optimal implementation, or that some
details of their configuration might be missing or misleading.
9.5 Threats to Validity
9.5.1 Platform
A potential threat to the validity of our work, is how we performed the setup of the Jade
platform. Since we wanted to perform our experiments on over a range of parameters, we
needed to find a way to reset the platform after a successive experiment and re-run it with a
new set of configurations. We solved this by having a jade agent called CompletionAgent
be responsible for waiting for every peer to message indicating their completion, which
would trigger the CompletionAgent to deregister all the peers from the MainContainer
and then reset the whole environment. The environment would then be set up again with
new parameters.
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What we see as a potential source for concern in this process is the possibility for error
during the deregistration. During the implementation of this process we encountered some
problems in making it work, as the CompletionAgent seemed to take an unreasonable
amount of time in completing its purpose. Although we found a solution to this problems,
there is still a risk that peers do not deregister as they should and carry through into the next
iteration of testing. This could lead to false information being injected into our experiment,
which would skew our results.
We have however minimized this risk by continuously developing unit test to verify
new code additions, as well as using JADE’s native GUI to supervise the behavior of the
peers while running. We therefore conclude that the risk is negligible.
9.5.2 Homomorphic encryption
As mentioned in Section 3.6, homomorphic encryption is still in an early stage of develop-
ment and therefore cannot be called a well-proven technology. Our method for aggregating
models from various peers is based on a homomorphic encryption scheme developed by
Pathak et al. but due to time constraints we could not actually implement it and instead
had to opt for simulating the results of applying this scheme. We therefore do not have
real-world results that can validate the applicability of this scheme, nor do we know if
applying this scheme would lead to increased run-time and resource consumption. While
this remains an interesting area for future research, as it stands now it remains a possible
threat to the validity of the results we’ve achieved and therefore also the conclusion we
have drawn from them.
9.5.3 Validation scheme
As we mentioned in Section 3.4, we chose not to implement stratified cross validation as
recommended by Kohavi [1995]. At the time the decision was made, the data sets we
employed had close to uniform class distribution, which would most likely not gain any
form of improvement from employing stratification. As the experiment progressed, we
added the Adult data set to our experimental procedure, which has a class distribution of
ca 75/25%. Instead of re-doing all of our previous experiments, we instead chose to keep
on validating with the normal form of cross-validation.
This choice might have introduced a small source of error into our results from the
Adult data set, as Kohavi [1995] notes that stratification is generally better scheme in
these situations, both in terms of bias and variance. We defend our choice by pointing
out that Kohavi’s paper report that the biggest improvement in stratification comes when
using a low amount of folds, and only shows minuscule improvement in the case of 10-
fold which is what we employ. The advantage of stratification is also most apparent in data
sets with many categories, whereas all our data sets are binary. We therefore conclude that
the variance of the results on the Adult data set might be slightly worse than the optimal
solution, but the risk of this is so negligible compared to other sources of variance, such as
the noise and regularization parameters.
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9.6 Future Work
In this section we propose some future areas of research which could lead to significant
improvements for our framework. The three first suggestions are topics we really wish
we could have achieved during this thesis project, but there just wasn’t enough time and
resources available. The last three suggestions are much more comprehensive, and can
possibly be considered a whole new project or research area.
Further develop and test the propagation of aggregated models: We experienced that
when we shared the aggregated models globally in our network, we could decrease the
standard deviation in our classification error, as well as sometimes improving the classifier.
Further research should go in expanding this behavior, as you could potentially propagate
models only to peers in geographic and/or demographic vicinity. This could possibly lead
to more specific models, which could give better classification rate to a specialized subset
of peers.
Test on datasets with uneven distribution: Another important area of research would
be to further test the applicability of peers sharing data to create better aggregated mod-
els. Our original research questions were designed to explore the validity of our proposed
method of doing differentially private machine learning, and our current research has been
limited to testing on a small amount of data sets which are publicly available. In the fu-
ture more research are needed on data sets with an uneven underlying distribution, which
could potentially provide results highlighting the usefulness of sharing information be-
tween peers. An ideal data set would be one where each peer only holds data which makes
up only a part of the solution.
Implement the Newscast algorithm for selecting peers: The Newscast algorithm is a
gossip protocol which facilitates a robust spread of information[Jelasity and Van Steen,
2002]. The core of the protocol involves periodic and pairvise interaction between pro-
cesses. Implementing this algorithm would allow our system to scale better when a big
number of peers are added to the network. The biggest bottleneck of our system at the mo-
ment is the peer sampling during the group forming, as it requires a single agent to act as a
manager for how groups are formed. The basic idea of the Newscast algorithm is that each
node, or peer in our situation, has a partial view of the system. All nodes exchange their
views periodically, which allows them to keep an up-to-date view locally and spread their
information throughout the network. Further research into this algorithm would allow us
to customize this algorithm so that peers in our network could form groups based on their
partial views of the network.
Full data protection for the data of each peer: This would involve dividing the ep-
silon by the biggest data set size, as formalized by Dwork and Roth [2013]. This is an
ever tighter privacy guarantee, but it would mean that the results would contain too much
noise. The reason for this is that the increased noise variance needed to protect full data
partitions given the sensitivity bound of Pathak et al. [2010] would ensure that essentially
no information is released to the aggregated model. We suspect that it would be possible
to modify Equation 3.12 in a way to include the number of participants in the aggregation
such that sensitivity decreases as more peers take part. This guarantee would need to be
formalized mathematically. If we succeeded in formalizing such a sensitivity bound, the
68
9.6 Future Work
increase in senstivity resulting from full data protection could be countered by increasing
the number of participants.
System that works in an online setting: It could potentially improve the system, as you
would have new data coming in which could replace old data with spent budgets. It could
also be potentially a big trade-off as you won’t have the same data history as you would
have in a system without differential privacy. Dwork has written about this in her book, so
we can take inspiration from there.
Security mechanisms for stopping sabotage: In our current system we have assumed
that the peers will be honest-but-curious when sharing their data, meaning that we have no
way of detecting dishonest peers. In a real world system there would need to be safeguards
against people which intend to either destroy the validity of the classifier created by feeding
misinformation into the system, or people who tries to intercept and expose the data from
other peers. Potential research areas for finding solutions could be intrusion detection
in distributed systems, fraud detection, trust networks and reputation systems, and also
further research into encryption.
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Appendix
9.7 Additional Results
9.7.1 Measuring error rate
Experiment Name Mean error Std. dev. λ
Centralized logistic regression 0.104 0.0059 2−8
Disjoint logistic regression 0.159 0.0026 2−5
Aggregated model,  = 1.0 0.163 0.0103 2−3
Ensemble model,  = 1.0 0.150 0.0045 2−5
Aggregated model,  = 0.1 0.182 0.0256 2−1
Ensemble model,  = 0.1 0.157 0.0117 2−2
Table 9.1: Measuring accuracy: Spambase
Experiment Name Mean error Std. dev. λ
Centralized logistic regression 0.306 0.0809 22
Disjoint logistic regression 0.279 0.0035 2−3
Aggregated model,  = 1.0 0.271 0.0056 2−2
Ensemble model,  = 1.0 0.274 0.0034 2−3
Aggregated model,  = 0.1 0.291 0.0112 20
Ensemble model,  = 0.1 0.285 0.0087 20
Table 9.2: Measuring accuracy: Susy
Actual
1 0
Predicted 1 273 49
0 81 518
Table 9.3: Confusion Matrix: Spambase. Local model only.
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Actual
1 0
Predicted 1 268 38
0 86 529
Table 9.4: Confusion Matrix: Spambase. Aggregated, DP model only.
Actual
1 0
Predicted 1 257 35
0 97 5d32
Table 9.5: Confusion Matrix: Spambase. Ensemble of Aggregated and Local.
9.7.2 Changes in number of participants
Figure 9.1: Effect of peer numbers. Spambase.
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9.7.3 Peer error rate variance
Model Mean error Peer std. dev.
Local, no privacy 0,159 0.016
Aggregated, d. privacy 0,163 0.000
Ensemble with both 0.150 0.006
Table 9.6: Variance among peers. Spambase.
Note that the results seen in Table 9.6 differ in the experimental setup described Section
6.1.5 in that each peer had 300 records instead of 250.
9.7.4 Effect of aggregation group size and model propagation
Group
size
Mean
error
Error
std. dev.
Peer error
std. dev.
1 0.233 0.0184 0.0435
5 0.217 0.0185 0.0399
10 0.223 0.0179 0.0368
15 0.221 0.0245 0.0290
20 0.205 0.0323 0.0257
Table 9.7: Effect of aggregation group size. Party-publishing. Spambase.
Group
size
Mean
error
Error
std. dev.
Peer error
std. dev.
1 0.215 0.0076 0.0036
5 0.211 0.0135 0.0125
10 0.197 0.0116 0.0191
15 0.200 0.0090 0.0225
20 0.195 0.0110 0.0202
Table 9.8: Effect of aggregation group size. All-publishing. Spambase.
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9.7.5 Value of budgeting privacy
Figure 9.2: Effect of Privacy Budgeting. Spambase.
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